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TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
ARLEN W. LANGVARDT*
ABSTRACT
With the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2009, Congress launched a major expansion of its regulatory
efforts regarding tobacco advertising and promotion. The Act restricts
advertising in various ways, featuring a requirement for updated textual
versions of health warnings long required for cigarette packages, as well as
a requirement that cigarette advertisements must be accompanied by prominently displayed color graphic images to be designed by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).
The Act’s advertising restrictions and the color graphics requirement
have been challenged on First Amendment grounds, as has an FDA regulation setting forth graphic images that tobacco companies were to use. A
federal court of appeals struck down the FDA regulation and sent the agency back to the drawing board, but another federal court of appeals upheld
the color graphics requirement and most of the advertising restrictions in the
statute. This Article analyzes the decisions in light of the various, sometimes
inconsistent strains of First Amendment principles that the Supreme Court
has adopted, explores what Congress and the FDA should be able to do in
regulating tobacco advertising and promotion without violating the First
Amendment, and recommends analyses for use in the event that the Supreme
Court agrees to decide a tobacco advertising case.
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“[T]obacco use, particularly among children and adolescents, poses perhaps
the single most significant threat to public health in the United States.”1
INTRODUCTION
Although one might reasonably assume that the U.S. Surgeon General,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the American Medical Association, or an organization of anti-tobacco activists made the statement quoted above, such an assumption would be incorrect. The observation came
from the U.S. Supreme Court, which included it in two decisions from the
not-too-distant past.2
Each time it made the quoted statement, however, the Court proceeded
to nullify a governmental attempt to combat this public health danger by
restricting tobacco advertising and marketing practices.3 In a 2000 decision, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,4 the Court held that the
FDA did not possess statutory authority to regulate tobacco products and
that the federal agency’s tobacco regulations, which included advertising
and marketing restrictions meant to protect minors, were therefore invalid.5 A year later, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,6 the Court employed
federal preemption and First Amendment grounds in striking down a
state’s protection-of-minors-based regulations dealing with tobacco advertising.7 The First Amendment analysis in Lorillard appeared to place significant limitations on governmental ability to regulate tobacco advertising
to a greater extent than contemplated by longstanding federal statutes that
mandate health-related warnings and prohibit televised advertisements for
tobacco products.8
The one-two punch delivered by Brown & Williamson and Lorillard,
though powerful in the short run, did not completely extinguish governmental
efforts to regulate tobacco advertising and promotion. Continuing public
1

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
Id.; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570 (2001).
3
529 U.S. 120, 128, 161; 533 U.S. 525, 533, 570–71.
4
529 U.S. 120.
5
Id. at 125–27, 133, 155–56, 161.
6
533 U.S. 525 (2001).
7
Id. at 546–51, 553, 561–67.
8
Although the advertising restrictions at issue in Lorillard arose under state law,
lessons from the Court’s First Amendment analysis are applicable to federal and state
restrictions alike. See id. at 561–67. Federal law has long required that health warnings be
placed on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333
(West 2014). In addition, federal law has banned tobacco advertisements from the
television and radio airwaves for more than forty years. See id. § 1335.
2
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health concerns and political considerations converged, resulting in a renewed federal push to regulate tobacco advertising and marketing in order
to safeguard the health of minors, if not the public generally.9 Congress
took a major step in 2009 by enacting the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act (TCA),10 which provided the FDA the regulatory
authority held lacking in Brown & Williamson.11 The TCA also required
the reissuance of nearly all of the FDA’s earlier protection-of-minorsbased tobacco advertising and marketing regulations, mandated the addition of graphic elements to the textual health warnings already required for
cigarette packages and advertisements, and instructed the FDA to develop
particular graphics-focused warning labels that cigarette producers would
be required to use.12
No longer able to lodge a lack-of-regulatory-authority objection, tobacco
companies invoked the First Amendment in challenging the FDA’s tobacco
advertising and promotion regulations as well as related TCA provisions.13
Two 2012 federal court of appeals decisions concerning these challenges
yielded divergent results.14 In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States,15 the Sixth Circuit upheld the bulk of the regulations and
related statutory provisions, including the TCA’s requirement that graphic
images be made a prominent part of the health-related warnings on packaging and in advertisements.16 The Sixth Circuit did not rule on the constitutionality of the particular graphics-focused warning labels the FDA devised,
however, because the labels were not developed until after the district court
had ruled and thus could not be considered on appeal.17 Later in 2012, however, the D.C. Circuit ruled in a case brought to challenge the actual labels.18

9

See Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation Over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2009, at A1.
10
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C. (2012)).
11
Id. § 101, 123 Stat. 1786 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387).
12
Id. § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1830 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1); § 201(d), 123 Stat.
1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)). See id. § 201(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)); § 201(b)(2), 123 Stat. 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)).
13
See generally Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509
(6th Cir. 2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
14
See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d 1205.
15
674 F.3d 509.
16
Id. at 531, 537, 544, 548, 551, 569.
17
Id. at 552–54.
18
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208.
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In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration,19 the court
held that the labels violated the First Amendment.20
Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds initially seemed to be good candidates for U.S. Supreme Court review, but matters did not play out that
way. In April 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Discount Tobacco.21 The FDA shortly thereafter ceased defending the labels tossed out
in R.J. Reynolds.22 Rather than seeking to persuade the Supreme Court to
hear the case, the FDA announced that it would abandon those labels and
develop a new response to the statutory directive regarding the inclusion
of graphic components.23
After Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds, important questions remain. Was the Discount Tobacco court correct in largely upholding the
advertising and marketing restrictions and requirements contemplated by
the TCA and, most importantly, in sustaining the requirement that prominent graphics components augment the mandated textual warnings? Was
the R.J. Reynolds court correct in striking down the particular labels the
FDA devised? What does the First Amendment permit the FDA to do in
terms of designing graphics-focused labels? How should the Supreme
Court rule if it later agrees to decide a case raising the sorts of issues Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds would have presented? This Article
takes up those questions and related ones.
Part I of the Article summarizes the history of federal efforts to regulate
tobacco advertising and promotion, beginning with the cigarette label warning requirement instituted nearly fifty years ago and continuing through the
TCA. Because government regulation of advertisements and product labels
necessarily involves speech-related measures, Part II furnishes background on
relevant First Amendment principles and especially Supreme Court decisions
establishing that the First Amendment offers commercial speech an intermediate level of protection. As will be seen, the Court’s commercial speech
precedents distinguish between content restrictions and required disclosures,
with the government having somewhat greater latitude to require advertising
disclosures than it has to restrict what may be said in commercial settings.24
19

Id.
Id. at 1222.
21
674 F.3d 509, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
22
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. Abandons Effort to Place Graphic
Labeling on Cigarettes, HEALTHDAY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.healthfinder.go
v/News/Article.aspx?id=674641.
23
Id.
24
Part II, infra, will also introduce related topics that are relevant to later sections of
the Article: the Court’s tendency in recent years to bolster the strength of the intermediate
protection extended to commercial speech without officially changing the controlling
20
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Part III discusses the decisions in Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds. It also assesses those decisions in light of the commercial speech
precedents examined in Part II. Part IV then turns to what the FDA and
Congress can do, or should be able to do, regarding tobacco advertising
and marketing regulation if the relevant Supreme Court precedents are
adhered to and correctly applied. In addition, Part IV considers how the
Supreme Court should resolve the key First Amendment issues if it hears a
later challenge to tobacco advertising and marketing regulations of the sort
required in or contemplated by the TCA. Part IV also adds cautionary
notes about alternative rationales that some Justices might be tempted to
put forth, but that the Court should reject, if it decides a tobacco advertising case or another case presenting similar issues.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION:
HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
A. The FCLAA: Purpose; Warning Requirement; and Preemption
After a 1964 report issued by a Surgeon General’s advisory committee
called cigarette smoking a significant health hazard, Congress responded
in 1965 with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA).25 The FCLAA’s § 1331 originally read:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling
and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health, whereby—
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each
package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.26

Approximately twenty years later, Congress replaced subsection (1) with a
broader subsection that spoke of making “the public ... adequately informed
commercial speech principles to which the Court has adhered for more than thirty-five
years; and the sentiment among some Justices that longstanding commercial speech
principles do not extend sufficient First Amendment protection to such speech.
25
Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (Supp. 1965)).
26
Id. § 2, 79 Stat. at 282.
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about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of
warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement
of cigarettes....”27 Congress did not change subsection (2), which remains
as originally enacted.28
The FCLAA’s 1965 version required, in § 1333, that all cigarette packages carry this warning: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to
Your Health.”29 In 1970, Congress strengthened the warning by requiring
that packages prominently display this less equivocal statement: “Warning:
The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.”30 Later amendments extended the warning requirement to cigarette advertisements and billboards, and provided for a rotating
set of warnings focused on particular smoking-related health risks such as
lung cancer, heart disease, or potential harm to a pregnant woman’s fetus.31
As will be seen, the 2009 TCA called for further changes in the warning
requirement and the manner in which the warning must appear.32
Section 1334 of the FCLAA contains two measures that further § 1331’s
stated purpose of avoiding “diverse [and] nonuniform” labeling and advertising requirements concerning the “relationship between smoking and
health.”33 First, § 1334(a) provides that “no statement relating to smoking and
health, other than the [warning] statement required by section 1333 of this
title, shall be required on any cigarette package.”34 Second, § 1334(b) helps
to establish the federal government as the primary regulator in the field by
providing that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or

27

Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 6(a)(1), 98
Stat. 2200 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1970)).
28
Compare Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92,
§ 2, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1 1965)), with 15
U.S.C.A. § 1331(2) (West 2014).
29
15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (amended 1970, 1984, 1985, and 2009).
30
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1335 (1970)). Although “1969” appeared in
the law’s title, actual enactment occurred in 1970. See id.
31
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, § 4(b) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333);
Act of Aug. 16, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-92, § 11(c), 99 Stat. 403 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333).
A similar warning requirement exists regarding smokeless tobacco packages and
advertisements. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402 (a)–(d) (2012).
32
See infra text accompanying notes 89–104.
33
§ 1331(2).
34
§ 1334(a). Language added to § 1334(a) by the TCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 201(a),
202(b), 206, 123 Stat. 1842, 1845, 1849, created a limited exception to this prohibition for
instances in which the Secretary of Health and Human Services requires a different
formulation of the required warning. See § 1334(a).
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promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter.”35
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,36 the Supreme Court held that § 1334(b)
preempted protection-of-minors-based Massachusetts regulations dealing with
cigarette advertising and marketing.37 Broadly reading § 1334(b), the Court
concluded that the statute contemplated preemption regardless of whether
the state provisions regulated cigarette advertisements’ content or restricted
their location.38 Among the Massachusetts regulations the Court struck
down was a location restriction that prohibited placement of outdoor advertisements for cigarettes within 1000 feet of schools, public parks, and similar places.39 In the TCA, Congress added subsection (c) to § 1334 and
specified that notwithstanding subsection (b)’s preemption provision,
states and localities “may enact statutes and promulgate regulations, based
on smoking and health, that ... impos[e] specific bans or restrictions on the
time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes.”40 Seemingly an attempt to limit the sweep of Lorillard’s
preemption ruling, subsection (c) should give states somewhat more room
to regulate without risking preemption,41 though the First Amendment
may still be a major obstacle.42
B. The FCLAA: Electronic Media Advertising Ban
A now-familiar feature of the FCLAA—its ban on radio and television advertisements for cigarettes—did not appear in the statute’s 1965

35

§ 1334(b).
533 U.S. 525 (2001).
37
See id. at 532–36. The Massachusetts regulations also pertained to the advertising
and promotion of other tobacco products such as smokeless tobacco. Id. At the time
Lorillard was decided, federal law did not contain a preemption provision regarding state
measures dealing with tobacco products other than cigarettes. See id. at 553. The TCA
added a smokeless tobacco-related preemption provision that is similar to the cigaretterelated preemption rule of § 1334(b). See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4406(b) (West 2014).
38
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 542, 548–51.
39
Id. at 542, 548–51. The Court noted the broad language employed by Congress in
§ 1334(b) and classified it as expansive enough to apply to even the location restrictions set
forth in the Massachusetts regulations. Id.
40
15 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)–(c) (West 2014).
41
See id.
42
For discussion of Lorillard’s treatment of First Amendment issues and what it
suggests for state and federal regulation of tobacco advertising and marketing, see infra
text accompanying notes 188–217.
36
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version.43 Soon, however, a Federal Trade Commission report discussed
the pervasiveness of broadcast media advertisements for cigarettes and the
general influence of radio and television on young people. The report
advocated banning cigarette commercials on radio and television.44 Congress responded affirmatively with what became the FCLAA’s § 1335.45
Shortly after the statute’s enactment, broadcasters challenged the § 1335
ban on First Amendment grounds. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,46 a 1971 decision, a three-judge federal district court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge by a two-to-one vote.47 The Supreme Court
affirmed without opinion a year later.48
Tobacco companies were not among the plaintiffs in Capital Broadcasting. The fact that the Supreme Court had not yet recognized First Amendment protection for commercial speech as of the time of Capital Broadcasting may help to explain tobacco companies’ decision not to challenge the
electronic media advertising ban when it was enacted.49 However, there is
43

The ban appears at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 2014). It was added to the FCLAA
by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1335 (1970)).
44
See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 543–44; Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582, 585–86 (D.D.C. 1971) (decision of three-judge court). At the same general time, the
Federal Communications Commission offered indications that it was considering
adopting a ban on electronic media advertisements for cigarettes. See id. at 588 (Wright,
J., dissenting).
45
15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
46
333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
47
Id. at 585–86.
48
Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), aff’g Capital Broad. Co.
v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
49
As later discussion will reveal, the Supreme Court did not recognize First Amendment
protection for commercial speech until 1976, well after Capital Broadcasting. See infra text
accompanying notes 137–41. That explanation, though reasonable, is not wholly convincing.
Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright, who served by designation on the three-judge Capital
Broadcasting court, dissented from the majority’s rejection of the broadcasters’ challenge
and vigorously argued that the electronic media advertising ban violated the First
Amendment because it effectively removed from the airwaves discussion of an important
public controversy over the relationship between smoking and health. Capital Broad.,
333 F. Supp. at 587, 589–94 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright’s argument rested on
First Amendment principles usually applied outside the advertising context. See infra text
accompanying note 133. Although his First Amendment argument did not carry the day,
the fact he made the argument and the further fact that the challenging broadcasters
would have offered some version of it indicate that the tobacco companies could have
asserted at least a plausible First Amendment argument if they had been inclined to
challenge the statute, even though commercial speech protection had not yet been
recognized by the Supreme Court. Interestingly, Judge Wright put forth the First
Amendment argument despite also making comments suggesting his disdain for the
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another possible explanation: tobacco companies believed they could benefit if cigarette ads disappeared from television.50 They actively sought to
persuade Congress to pass a differently formulated statute from which the
desired disappearance of televised ads would have resulted,51 and they were
content with the advertising ban Congress enacted instead.52
marketing practices of tobacco companies. See Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 587–89,
590 (Wright, J., dissenting).
50
This seemingly counter-intuitive explanation (after all, why would cigarette
manufacturers want a government-imposed restriction on their speech?) can be found in
Judge Wright’s Capital Broadcasting dissent. 333 F. Supp. at 588–89 (Wright, J.,
dissenting). Judge Wright noted that two years prior to the 1969 enactment of the
advertising ban, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) concluded that
cigarette advertisements amounted to statements about one side of a controversial issue of
public importance: the relationship between smoking and health. Id. at 587. The FCC,
therefore, ruled that in view of the agency’s then-existing fairness doctrine and the public
interest standard imposed on licensed broadcasters, television stations were required to
broadcast anti-smoking messages if they aired cigarette advertisements. In re Complaint
Directed to Station WCBS-TV, N.Y.C., N.Y., 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 381–82 (1967) (letter
ruling); In re Television Station WCBS-TV, N.Y.C., N.Y., 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 938, 949
(1967) (memorandum opinion affirming letter ruling). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit later upheld the FCC’s action. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1097–99, 1101–04 (D.C. Cir. 1968). According to Judge Wright’s Capital
Broadcasting dissent, the required anti-smoking spots were so effective that they had “a
devastating effect on cigarette consumption” during the late 1960s. 333 F. Supp. at 588
(Wright, J., dissenting). Cigarette companies thus found themselves in a difficult position.
As Judge Wright put it, “the individual tobacco companies could not stop advertising for
fear of losing their competitive position; yet for every dollar they spent to advance their
product, they forced the airing of more anti-smoking advertisements and hence lost more
customers.” Id.
51
While Congress was considering cigarette-related legislation in 1969, a cigarette
industry representative appeared before a Senate subcommittee and indicated that the
industry desired an antitrust exemption under which tobacco companies could agree with
each other not to advertise on electronic media. See Cigarette Advertising and Labeling:
Hearing on H.R. 6543 Before Consumer Subcomm. of S. Comm. on Commerce, 91st
Cong. 78 (1969) (testimony of Joseph F. Cullman III, Chairman, Philip Morris, Inc.). See
also Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 588, 587 n.10 (Wright, J., dissenting). Because the
FCC’s fairness doctrine ruling “had clearly made electronic media advertising a losing
proposition for the [tobacco] industry, ... a voluntary withdrawal [of electronic media
advertising] would have saved the companies approximately $250,000,000 in advertising
costs ... and [would have] removed most anti-smoking messages from the air.” Capital
Broad., 333 F. Supp. at 588 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright asserted that Congress
“quickly complied” with the tobacco industry’s desires by making the broadcast
advertising ban statutory in nature. See id.
52
In Judge Wright’s view, the tobacco industry must have been content with the
electronic media advertising ban, given that “as both the cigarette advertisements and
most anti-smoking messages left the air, the tobacco companies [were able to transfer]
their advertising budgets to other forms of advertising such as newspapers and magazines
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Even though Supreme Court decisions have recognized significant First
Amendment protection for commercial speech since Capital Broadcasting,53 tobacco companies have not challenged the electronic media advertising ban.54 For more than forty years, therefore, § 1335 has proscribed the
advertising of cigarettes “on any medium of electronic communication
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission.”55
C. The FDA’s Ill-Fated Efforts During the 1990s
As concerns continued regarding smoking and health and particularly
the dangers to minors, the FDA mounted a significant regulatory effort
during the mid-1990s.56 This effort featured various regulations that
restricted the advertising and marketing practices of tobacco companies.57
where there was no fairness doctrine to require a response.” Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp.
at 589 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright characterized the electronic media
advertising ban as a “dramatic legislative coup for the tobacco industry” because “the
cigarette smoking controversy [had been] removed from the air.” Id. As a result, “the
decline in cigarette smoking was abruptly halted and cigarette consumption almost
immediately turned upward again.” Id. at 589, 589 n.18.
53
See infra text accompanying notes 137–58.
54
The Supreme Court’s commercial speech decisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 137–263, would give tobacco companies plenty about which to argue if they were
inclined to challenge the electronic media advertising ban. Although the ban’s
longstanding nature would not deprive them of the ability to contest its constitutionality,
that longstanding nature nevertheless may be part of a strategic calculus undertaken by
tobacco companies. With the lack of televised advertisements for cigarettes and other
tobacco products being a fact of life for so many years, a constitutional challenge to the
ban—even a successful constitutional challenge—could be perceived by the government
and the public as an overreach. If the constitutional challenge were to succeed, there
might be a backlash in which the government and private interest groups could decide to
sponsor more anti-smoking spots on television and otherwise engage in enhanced efforts
to communicate anti-smoking messages. Therefore, tobacco companies may well have
decided that the status quo, in which they cannot advertise on television or radio but can
widely advertise otherwise, is acceptable.
55
15 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (West 2014). The ban took effect on Jan. 1, 1971. See Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 3, 84 Stat. 87 (1970). In 1973,
Congress amended the radio and television advertising ban so that broadcast advertisements
for “little cigars” were also prohibited. Little Cigar Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-109, 87 Stat.
352 (1973) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1335). A similar ban on television and radio ads for
smokeless tobacco has existed since 1986. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 4402(c) (West 2014).
56
See generally Tobacco Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor &
Human Res., 105th Cong. 48–50 (1998) (statement of William B. Shultz, Deputy
Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.).
57
C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA BURROWS, RL32619, FDA REGULATION OF
TOBACCO PRODUCTS: A HISTORICAL, POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. (2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL32619.
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Tobacco companies challenged the regulations on lack-of-regulatoryauthority and First Amendment grounds.58
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,59 holding that the FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco
products. The Court, therefore, invalidated the FDA regulations without
reaching the First Amendment issues.60 The regulations would eventually
obtain new life, however, as the following subsection reveals.
D. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009
Legislative efforts to provide the regulatory authority held lacking in
Brown & Williamson bore fruit in 2009 when Congress enacted the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA).61 The statute
expressly granted the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products,62
authorized and instructed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
promulgate regulations dealing with tobacco product advertising and marketing,63 and amended the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
in important respects.64 The discussion here will focus on the TCA provisions dealing with tobacco product labeling, advertising, and marketing
because those provisions have triggered First Amendment-based objections and are thus most relevant to this Article.65 Before turning to those
58

See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
Id. at 126.
60
Id. at 126, 133, 155–56, 161. As will be seen in the immediately following subsection,
the TCA resurrected the invalidated regulations. Therefore, discussion of what the
regulations called for will be deferred until that subsection.
61
Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 387–387t (2012)).
62
21 U.S.C.A. § 387a (West 2014). The TCA extended broad-ranging authority to the
FDA, including, for instance, powers to develop tobacco product standards, regulate
product ingredients, mandate submission of reports from tobacco companies, and require
pre-market approval of new tobacco products that are not substantially equivalent to ones
previously on the market. Id. §§ 387d, 387e, 387f, 387g, 387i, 387j, 387k. Congress
specifically barred the FDA, however, from banning the sale of cigarettes and various
other tobacco products. Id. § 387g(d)(3).
63
Id. §§ 387a-1, 387f(d).
64
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)–(d) (West 2014); see also id. § 4402 (amending smokeless
tobacco warning requirements).
65
For examination of the cases in which portions of the TCA have been challenged on
First Amendment grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 308–406. For a further
overview of the TCA, see Clay Calvert, Wendy Allen-Brunner & Christina M. Locke,
Playing Politics or Protecting Children? Congressional Action & A First Amendment
Analysis of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act., 36 J. LEGIS. 201,
221–36 (2010).
59
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provisions, however, it is useful to examine pertinent findings and statements of purpose that Congress included in the TCA.
1. Legislative Findings and Purposes
In lengthy findings underlying the TCA,66 Congress repeatedly noted the
health risks associated with smoking and set forth its conclusions regarding
the influence of tobacco companies’ advertising and promotional activities on
minors.67 Congress called nicotine an “addictive drug”68 and characterized
minors’ use of tobacco products as a “pediatric disease of considerable proportions that results in new generations of tobacco-dependent children and
adults.”69 Congress also found that tobacco companies’ advertising and
marketing activities “contribute significantly” to adolescents’ use of tobacco products containing nicotine,70 that past efforts to restrict such advertising and marketing had not sufficiently curbed adolescents’ use of
tobacco products, and that “comprehensive restrictions on the sale, promotion, and distribution of such products are [therefore] needed.”71
Continuing its findings, Congress expressed concern about tobacco
companies’ supposed practice of directing advertising toward minors72 and
observed that minors are regularly exposed to tobacco advertising and promotional activities.73 Such exposure creates “favorable beliefs” regarding
tobacco use and “increases the number of young people who begin to use
tobacco.”74 Tobacco marketing, Congress maintained, influences children
66

See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 387–387t (2012)).
67
See id. § 2(1), (2), (5), (6), (13)–(15), (17), (18), (22)–(24), (29), (33), (47), (48).
68
Id. § 2(3).
69
Id. § 2(1). Those users, Congress found, risk experiencing “cancer, heart disease,
and other serious adverse health effects.” Id. § 2(2).
70
Id. § 2(5).
71
Id. § 2(6).
72
Id. § 2(15), (47), (48).
73
Id. § 2(18). Congress observed that advertising “often misleadingly portrays” tobacco
use as “socially acceptable and healthful to minors.” Id. § 2(17). In addition, Congress
concluded that tobacco ads during sporting events and tobacco companies’ sponsorship of
sporting events helped to create the impression that tobacco use could play a role in “the
healthy lifestyle associated with rigorous sporting activity.” Id. § 2(19).
74
Id. § 2(20). Congress found that a fifty percent reduction in the use of tobacco by
minors “would prevent well over 10,000,000 of today’s children from becoming regular,
daily smokers” and would save more than 3,000,000 of them from “premature death due
to tobacco-induced disease.” Id. § 2(14). The related savings in healthcare costs,
Congress asserted, would be roughly $75 billion. Id. Referring not merely to minors but
to the public generally, Congress also noted that tobacco use is “the foremost preventable
cause of death in America,” that it causes more than 400,000 deaths annually in the
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more than it does adults.75 The findings reflected the legislative judgment
that comprehensive advertising restrictions, including those in the previously invalidated FDA regulations, “will have a positive effect on the
smoking rates of young people.”76
The findings discussed above relate directly to three of the legislative
purposes identified in the TCA. First, in a list of purposes connected with
the grant of regulatory authority to the FDA,77 Congress sought to recognize
the FDA as the primary federal regulator “with respect to the manufacture,
marketing, and distribution of tobacco products….”78 Second, Congress
wished to ensure that the FDA possessed “the authority to address issues of
particular concern to public health officials, especially the use of tobacco
by young people and dependence on tobacco.”79 Third, Congress sought to
“promote cessation” of tobacco use and thereby “reduce disease risk and
the social costs associated with tobacco-related diseases.”80
The TCA’s stated purposes must be considered alongside those set
forth for many years in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act (FCLAA)81 because the TCA amended certain aspects of the earlier
law82 but left its purposes section untouched.83 As noted earlier, the
FCLAA’s purposes section noted the objective of making the federal government the key regulator of cigarette labeling and advertising insofar as
United States, and that approximately 8.6 million Americans suffer from chronic illnesses
related to smoking. Id. § 2(13). The findings labeled these problems a “public health
crisis created by actions of the tobacco industry.” Id. § 2(29).
75
Id. § 2(23). Congress found that “more than 80 percent of youth smoke three
heavily marketed brands, while only 54 percent of adults, 26 and older, smoke these same
brands.” Id.
76
Id. § 2(25). See also id. § 2(30)–(32). The FDA regulations alluded to here are the
ones invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2000 on the ground that the FDA lacked
authority to regulate tobacco products. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60.
Congress also considered other nations’ use of tobacco advertising restrictions and found,
as a lesson from international experience, that “stringent and comprehensive [advertising
regulations] have a greater impact on overall tobacco use and young people’s use than
weaker or less comprehensive ones.” Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(27), 123 Stat. at 1778.
77
Id. § 3(1)–(10).
78
Id. § 3(1).
79
Id. § 3(2).
80
Id. § 3(9). Another stated purpose has partial relevance to the issues addressed in this
Article. Congress indicated it wanted to “ensure that consumers are better informed…,” id.
§ 3(6), though the remainder of that stated purpose went on to refer to the authority granted
to the FDA to require tobacco companies to inform the public of the results of “research ...
relating to the health and dependency effects or safety of tobacco products.” Id.
81
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331–1341 (West 2014).
82
See infra text accompanying notes 89–104.
83
See § 1331, amended by Pub. L. 98-474, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 2204 (1984).
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the relationship between smoking and health is concerned.84 In addition,
the purposes section stated that the FCLAA-required warning statement
for cigarette packages and advertisements was meant to serve as a means
of “adequately inform[ing]” the public “about any adverse health effects
of cigarette smoking.”85 Unsurprisingly, then, there exists considerable
alignment between the FCLAA’s longstanding purposes and the objectives
more recently articulated in the TCA.
2. Labeling and Advertising Provisions: Changes in § 1333
The FCLAA, as amended by the TCA, contains various provisions
dealing with the labeling, advertising, and marketing of tobacco products.86 As the following discussion will reveal, these provisions mix direct
regulation in the form of stated requirements or commands with indirect
regulation through grants of authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS Secretary), whose department houses the FDA.87
In passing the TCA, Congress significantly changed the content and
manner of display of the warning that must appear on cigarette packages
and in cigarette advertisements.88 Congress amended § 1333 of the FCLAA
by mandating that cigarette packages and advertisements contain, on a rotating basis, one of these nine statements (each of which must be preceded by
the word “Warning” in all capital letters):
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

84

Cigarettes are addictive.
Tobacco smoke can harm your children.
Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease.
Cigarettes cause cancer.
Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease.
Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby.
Smoking can kill you.
Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.
Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to
your health.89

See id.; supra text accompanying notes 25–26.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1331(1).
86
Id. §§ 1333, 1335, 1335a.
87
Id. §§ 1332(9), 1333, 1334, 1335a, 1341.
88
Id. § 1333(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 201(a), (b),
206 (2009).
89
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
§ 201(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1776, 1842 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)
(2012)). Subsection 1333(a)(2) describes the specific typography requirements for the
85
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These warnings preserve the general thrust of the rotating warnings
previously required, but the new list expands the number of warnings in
the rotation.90 The individual warnings in the new list tend to be shorter
and less detailed than certain ones of the formerly required warnings91—
perhaps to make them simpler and more understandable and perhaps in
recognition of new manner-of-display requirements to which we now turn.
Section 1333’s previous version required a conspicuous display of the
warning and included other warning size and appearance directives,92 but
the TCA amendments establish even more specific and detailed manner-ofdisplay provisions.93 The amendments applicable to cigarette packages
require that the warning appear in, and occupy, the upper fifty percent of the
packages’ front and rear panels.94 Besides dictating that “Warning” appear
in all capital letters prior to the remainder of the relevant text, the new version of § 1333 requires, as a general rule, the use of seventeen-point type
for the warning.95 The TCA amendments further call for the warning’s text
to appear in black on a white background or white on a black background,
in a manner that contrasts with other printed material on the package.96
The new version of § 1333 established by the TCA reflects similarly
detailed requirements concerning cigarette advertisements’ display of the
warning.97 The warning and a statement regarding the tar, nicotine, and
other similar content of the advertised cigarette, if such a statement is
required by the HHS Secretary under authority granted elsewhere in the

warnings in (a)(1). 15 U.S.C.A. 1333(a)(2) (West 2014). See id. § 201(c), 123 Stat. at 1844
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (2012)).
90
Section 1333’s previous version called for only four warnings to be in the rotation.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (c) (Supp. II 1984) (amended 1985, 2009).
91
Compare, e.g., § 1333(a) (2012) (listing among rotating warnings called for in current
version, “WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause
cancer,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease,” and “WARNING:
Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby”), with § 1333(a) (Supp. II 1984) (listing
among rotating warnings called for in superseded version, “SURGEON GENERAL’S
WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May
Complicate Pregnancy,” and “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking By
Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight”).
92
See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (Supp. II 1984) (amended 1985, 2009).
93
See Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a)(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d), 123 Stat. at 1843
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d) (2012)).
94
Id. § 201(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (2012)).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d), (d) (e)(3) (West 2014)
(original contains two subsections designated (d)).
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statute,98 must occupy at least twenty percent of the advertisement’s physical area and must otherwise be displayed prominently at the top of the
advertisement.99 Capital letters must be used for the word “Warning,” and
the remainder of the warning’s text must appear in conspicuous, legible
type that is black if the background is white or white if the background is
black.100 The new § 1333 goes on to list other detailed display-related
requirements, including provisions dealing with the width of a border in
which the required warning must appear and provisions mandating the use
of specified lettering sizes (which vary depending upon the type and dimensions of the particular advertisement).101
In another major change, the TCA amendments to § 1333 went beyond
the previous version’s focus on the text of the required warning and mandated inclusion of a graphics element.102 Congress directed the HHS Secretary
to issue, within twenty-four months of the TCA’s enactment, regulations that
“require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking” to accompany the warning’s text.103 Congress further stated that the
Secretary would have the discretion to adjust the previously noted requirements regarding the warning’s language, type size, and format, “so that both
the graphics and accompanying [warning] label statements are clear, conspicuous, [and] legible, and appear within the specified area.”104
3. FDA Regulations Concerning Graphic Images
In 2011, the Secretary issued regulations concerning nine graphic images devised in response to the congressional command to develop graphic
98

See id. § 1333(e).
Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2012)).
100
Id.
101
Id. Similar warning and display requirements apply to smokeless tobacco packages
and advertisements. See id. § 204, 123 Stat. at 1846 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
4402 (2012)). However, the smokeless tobacco warning requirements do not mandate use
of a graphics element as part of the warning. See id.
102
Id. § 201(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012)).
103
Id. The Secretary issued the called-for regulations in 2011. See infra text
accompanying notes 105–09; see also Cigarette Package and Advertising Warnings, 21
C.F.R. §§ 1141.1–1141.16 (2012).
104
Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333(d) (2012)); see id. § 201(b)(2), (4), 123 Stat. at 1843, 1844 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2), (4) (2012)) (granting similar authority to HHS Secretary to
vary display requirements); id. § 202(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1333(e) (2012)) (granting similar authority to HHS Secretary to vary display
requirements, warning text, and color graphics if Secretary believes changes would help
public understand dangers of using tobacco products).
99
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images for use on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements.105
The nine graphic images were integrated with the TCA’s nine required
textual warnings106 and were to be used on a rotating basis.107 Each one
also included a display of “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” a help-line phone number
for persons seeking to kick the smoking habit.108 The graphic images featured these visual depictions (photographs except where noted):
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

105

A crying woman (accompanying the text about tobacco
smoke causing fatal lung disease in nonsmokers).
An adult holding a small child with smoke visible in the air
(accompanying the text about tobacco smoke harming children).
A cigarette-smoking man who had smoke coming out of a
tracheotomy opening (accompanying the text about cigarettes being addictive).
Ugly-looking diseased lungs (accompanying the text about
cigarettes causing fatal lung disease).
A dead, apparently autopsied body with a lengthy stitchedup incision running down the chest (accompanying the text
that “[s]moking can kill you”).
A baby receiving hospital care (a drawing accompanying
the text that “[s]moking during pregnancy can harm your
baby”).
A person with an oxygen mask over his mouth and nose as
an apparent emergency measure (accompanying the text
about cigarettes causing strokes and heart disease).
A person’s diseased-looking lips and rotted-out teeth (accompanying the text about cigarettes causing cancer).

21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.1–1141.16; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1331(d) (West 2014) (statutory
directive to Secretary).
106
See supra text accompanying notes 89–90.
107
Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(c), 123 Stat. at 1844 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1333(c)); see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.10, 1141.14 (2011).
108
See Ann Simoneau, Office of Compliance & Enforcement Ctr. for Tobacco Prods.,
Compliance Training for Small Tobacco Manufacturers: Required Warnings for Cigarette
Packaging & Advertising Final Rule 21 CFR 1141 (July 26, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/tobaccoproducts/resourcesforyou/forindustry/retailer/ucm265299.ppt (making graphic
images in electronic files part of 21 C.F.R. §§ 1141.12 (2011) through incorporation by
reference); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1141.16 (2011) (calling for smoking cessation-related
disclosure to be part of required warnings).
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A man wearing a t-shirt that bore an “I Quit” inscription
and a no-smoking symbol (accompanying the text that
“[q]uitting smoking now greatly reduces risks to your
health”).109

As will be seen, a federal court of appeals decision identifying what it
regarded as First Amendment problems with the graphic images just described led the FDA to announce in 2013 that it would abandon those
images and devise different ones.110 Nevertheless, the abandoned images
remain relevant to this Article’s analysis of the leading decisions dealing
with the TCA and to this Article’s consideration of what the federal government can and should be able to do in regulating tobacco labeling and
advertising without violating the First Amendment.111
4. FDA Regulations Concerning Advertising and Marketing
Other TCA provisions dealing with tobacco product advertising and
marketing included a section resurrecting the FDA regulations that the
Supreme Court invalidated in 2000 in Brown & Williamson.112 Of course,
the TCA’s grant of regulatory authority to the FDA removed the basis for
invalidation identified in that decision.113 Congress, therefore, directed the
HHS Secretary to reissue the earlier regulations with certain modifications
outlined in the statute.114 The Secretary complied with a 2010 set of regulations that reprised the earlier rules and restricted tobacco product advertising
and marketing in various ways.115

109

See Simoneau, supra note 108; see also § 1141.12.
See infra text accompanying notes 375–77.
111
See infra text accompanying notes 414–84.
112
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 155–56, 161 (2000).
113
Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 101, 123 Stat. at 1786 (2009) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 387a (2012)).
114
See id. § 102(a), 123 Stat. at 1830–31 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1
(2012)).
115
See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,225, 13,230–32 (Mar. 19,
2010) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140). The FDA preceded the regulations with
background information and explanations that touched on health issues, smoking rates
(especially among minors), and tobacco product advertising in ways similar to the
findings and statements of purposes that Congress articulated in the TCA. See id. at
13,226–29 (discussing Background, Overview, and Scientific Information preceding
rules in part 1140). For discussion of the congressional findings and statements of
purpose, see supra text accompanying notes 66–85.
110
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Product-distribution provisions in the 2010 regulations prohibited the
sale of tobacco products to persons younger than eighteen years of age and
generally required the checking of photographic identification to verify the
age of purchasers other than those over the age of twenty-six.116 The regulations also barred tobacco companies from distributing free samples of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products except at adults-only facilities,117 and prohibited the sale of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products through vending machines and self-service displays except at facilities where persons under the age of eighteen are not allowed.118
Turning to cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertising, the
2010 regulations listed permissible types of advertising119 and mandated use
of a text-only, black-and-white format in most instances.120 The regulations
also barred the use of tobacco product brand names, symbols, logos, and
116

21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(a), (b) (2010).
Id. § 1140.16(d)(1)–(2). The regulations contain a detailed list of conditions
necessary for a facility to qualify for adults-only status. See id. § 1140.16(d)(2)(iii); see
also id. § 1440.34(b) (prohibiting furnishing of gift of any non-tobacco item in
consideration of purchase of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco).
118
Id. §§ 1140.14(c), 1140.16(c)(1)–(2). Thus, a “direct, face-to-face exchange,” was
to become the norm. Id. § 1140.14(c); see id. § 1140.16(c)(1)–(2). The regulations
recognize a further exception, however, for mail-order sales. Id. § 1140.16(c)(2)(i).
119
See id. § 1140.30(a)(1). The regulations listed these permissible advertising types:
in newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or “other publications”; on “billboards, posters
and placards”; in promotional material (whether point-of-sale or non-point-of-sale); and
“in audio or video formats delivered at a point-of-sale.” Id. A tobacco seller intending to
advertise in a medium other than those just listed must notify the FDA at least thirty days
prior to the use of such advertising and must “discuss the extent to which the advertising
... may be seen by persons younger than 18 years of age.” Id. § 1140.30(a)(2).
120
Id. § 1140.32(a). In requiring such advertising to employ “only black text on a
white background,” the regulation would bar uses of different colors, visual depictions
other than of words, and graphic images. See id. The regulation recognized two
exceptions, however, to the text-only, black-and-white format. One was for facilities
where vending machine and self-service displays would be allowed (places to which
persons younger than eighteen would not be admitted), assuming that the advertising was
not visible from outside the facility. Id. § 1140.32(a)(1). See id. § 1140.16(c)(1)–(2). The
other exception was for newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or other publications that
qualify as adult publications. To so qualify, the publication’s readers under the age of
eighteen cannot comprise more than fifteen percent of the readership, and the readership
must include fewer than two million persons under the age of eighteen. Id. §
1140.32(a)(2). As previously noted, supra note 119, the regulation states that audio or
video advertising is allowed if it is “delivered at a point-of-sale.” Id. § 1140.30(a)(1). In
such instances, the audio format (whether used with or without accompanying video)
“shall be limited to words only with no music or sound effects.” Id. § 1140.32(b)(1). The
video format “shall be limited to static black text only on a white background.” Id. §
1140.32(b)(2).
117
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slogans on non-tobacco items,121 and prohibited tobacco companies from
using their products’ brand names and logos when sponsoring sporting
events, other events, and sports teams.122 As will be seen, these advertising
and marketing provisions have triggered First Amendment challenges.123
5. Other TCA Provisions Dealing with Advertising and Promotion
The TCA includes various other advertising- and promotion-related
provisions. One such provision prohibits tobacco product manufacturers
from making express or implied representations on product labels “or
through the media or advertising,” that are likely to mislead consumers
into believing that the FDA approved the relevant product, endorsed it, or
deemed it to be safe for use by consumers, or that the manufacturer’s
compliance with FDA requirements made the product less harmful.124 In
addition, the TCA authorizes the HHS Secretary to adopt regulations partially restricting access to, and advertising and promotion of, a tobacco
product if the Secretary determines that such regulations would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health.”125 The TCA also prohibits
121

Id. § 1140.34(a) (prohibiting the placement of tobacco product brands and other
similar indicia on t-shirts, hats, and many other promotional items).
122
Id. § 1140.34(c) (permitting Tobacco companies to sponsor such events and use
their official corporate name in doing so if that name is not the same as a brand name of
its products).
123
See infra text accompanying notes 308–446. The 2010 regulations did not include
restrictions on placement of outdoor advertising of tobacco products—restrictions that
had appeared in the mid-1990s regulations—because similar restrictions imposed at the
state level had been struck down by the Supreme Court on preemption and First
Amendment grounds in a 2001 decision. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 532–36, 561–64 (2001); Regulation Restricting the Sale and Distribution of
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg.
13,225, 13,226 (Mar. 19, 2010) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140). In a
background explanation preceding the 2010 regulations, the FDA stated that it was
considering whether outdoor advertising placement restrictions might be crafted to
comply with First Amendment constraints outlined by the Supreme Court, but that the
agency was not then proposing any such rule. Regulation Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes, supra. In studying the outdoor advertising issue, the FDA was
following up on a TCA provision that authorized the FDA to consider ways (if any) to
fashion such a rule without violating the First Amendment. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 387a1(2)(E) (West 2014).
124
Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 103(b)(7)(tt), 123 Stat. at 1834 (2009) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 331(tt) (2012)).
125
Id. § 906(d), 123 Stat. at 1796 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)
(2012)). This authority to restrict advertising and promotion extends, according to the
statute, as far as the First Amendment permits. Id.
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the making of false or misleading representations on tobacco product labels and in advertisements for such products,126 and authorizes the HHS
Secretary to promulgate a regulation requiring pre-approval of statements
a tobacco company plans to include on product labels.127
Although the TCA does not require that the FDA pre-approve advertising statements regarding tobacco products generally, it does so regarding
those of the modified-risk variety.128 A modified-risk tobacco product is
one in which the manufacturer:
x
x
x
x

expressly or impliedly represents, through labeling or advertising, that the product is meant to reduce the harm or
risk of disease associated with other tobacco products;
represents that the product or its smoke contains less of a potentially harmful substance than other tobacco products do;
uses the terms “‘light,’ ‘mild,’ or ‘low’ or similar descriptors” on the product label or in advertising; or
takes action that is “directed to consumers through the media or otherwise” and would reasonably cause consumers to
conclude that the product is less harmful or less likely to
cause disease than are other tobacco products.129

If a tobacco product meets any of the above criteria for modified-risk
status, the product cannot be sold without the HHS Secretary’s pre-market
approval.130 An application for such an order must include and describe
“any proposed advertising and labeling.”131

126

Id. § 903(a), 123 Stat. at 1788–89 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387c(a)(1),
(a)(7)(A) (2012)).
127
Id. § 903(b), 123 Stat. at 1789–90 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387c(b)
(2012)). Such a regulation would be designed to ensure compliance with the labeling
requirements provided for in the TCA and relevant regulations. Id. However, Congress
did not adopt a pre-approval rule regarding tobacco product advertisements, with the
partial exception of advertisements for modified-risk products. Id.
128
Id.; see id. § 911(d), 123 Stat. at 1813 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387k(d)(1) (2012)).
129
Id. § 911(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 1812–13 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387k(b)(2) (2012)).
130
Id. § 911(b)(1) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(a) (2012)).
131
Id. § 911(d), 123 Stat. at 1813 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(d)(1)
(2012)). As part of a decision to grant pre-market approval of a modified-risk tobacco
product on the market, see id. § 911(g), 123 Stat. at 1814 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 387k(g) (2012)), the Secretary may also require that the product’s advertising
and labeling enable the public to comprehend the relative health and disease risks
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Because the TCA’s advertising and promotion provisions and related
FDA regulations set forth speech-based requirements and restrictions, they
have been challenged on First Amendment grounds. The leading appellate
decisions addressing those challenges will be discussed and analyzed later
in this Article.132 In order to lay a foundation for that analysis, this Article
now examines relevant First Amendment principles as articulated and
applied in Supreme Court decisions.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH: HISTORY
AND OVERVIEW
When interpreting the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has long
distinguished between noncommercial speech and commercial speech.
The former category, which receives “full” First Amendment protection,
includes political speech and other noncommercial expression connected
with literary, artistic, scientific, economic, or moral matters or with a
broad range of subjects of public concern.133 Commercial speech, on the
other hand, receives no more than “intermediate” First Amendment protection.134 The Court usually defines commercial speech as expression that
“does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”135 Typical examples of commercial speech include advertisements for products, services,
or businesses.136

associated with the product and those associated with non-modified risk tobacco
products. Id. § 911(h), 123 Stat. at 1816 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387k(h) (2012)).
132
See infra text accompanying notes 308–446.
133
E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 340 (2010); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406, 412 (1989); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
A government restriction on the content of fully protected speech violates the First
Amendment unless the government accomplishes the difficult task of demonstrating that
the restriction is necessary to fulfill a compelling government purpose. E.g., Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 340.
134
E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 749–57, 763–65, 770–72 (1976).
135
E.g., id. at 776. Yet the definition of commercial speech has sometimes led to
confusion and therefore may be in need of clarification. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can
You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 589–93, 605–15 (2012).
136
E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). Functional equivalents of advertisements, such as
product labels, also constitute commercial speech. E.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 478–80 (1995).
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A. Intermediate Protection and the Controlling Test
Until approximately forty years ago, the Supreme Court classified
commercial expression as falling outside the First Amendment’s protective
scope.137 After three decisions over roughly a decade laid the groundwork
for a doctrinal shift,138 the Court held in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council139 that commercial speech merits a role
in the First Amendment’s marketplace of ideas.140 The Court declined,
however, to give commercial speech the “full” First Amendment protection extended to political speech and other noncommercial expression.141
Two key distinctions informed the Court’s conclusion regarding the appropriate level of protection: when faced with government regulation,
commercial speech is more durable than noncommercial speech; and
commercial speech’s accuracy or inaccuracy is more readily verifiable
than is the accuracy or inaccuracy of noncommercial expression.142 The
Court, therefore, recognized an intermediate level of First Amendment
protection for commercial speech and made that level a maximum by

137

See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942).
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821, 826 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384–85, 389 (1973); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964). For discussion of these decisions’ roles in
laying the groundwork for the extension of intermediate First Amendment protection to
commercial speech, see Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 593–96 (2000).
139
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
140
See id. at 756–57, 759–61, 762–63, 765. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
justified placing constitutional limits on the government’s ability to regulate commercial
expression by noting that the First Amendment contemplates a right on the part of readers
and listeners to receive information on matters of interest to them, that the information
provided by commercial advertising may be of even greater interest to some persons than
is information on political matters, and that if the First Amendment contemplates a right
to receive information of interest, there must be a correlative right to speak regarding
such matters. Id. at 753, 756–57, 762–63, 765. The law struck down in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy was one that prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices they
would charge for prescription drugs. Id. at 763, 765.
141
Id. at 770–71. See id. at 760–63, 765, 769–70.
142
Id. at 771 n.24. It is unclear to what extent the Court continues to place significant
weight on these distinctions as a basis for the less-than-full First Amendment protection
extended to commercial speech. Compare, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 498–99 (1996) (citing the distinctions), with Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.,
535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002), and Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527
U.S. 173, 183–92, 193–94 (1999) (finding no mention of the distinctions in either decision).
138
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holding that it would apply to non-misleading commercial speech about
lawful activities.143
In a 1980 decision, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,144 the Court began clarifying intermediate protection’s
meaning by announcing a still-utilized four-part test that applies when a
government restriction on commercial speech is challenged on First
Amendment grounds.145 Part one of the test governs the determination of
whether the relevant commercial expression may stake any claim to First
Amendment protection by asking whether the commercial speech affected
by the government regulation at issue pertains to a lawful activity and is
non-misleading.146 If this threshold question yields a conclusion that the
affected commercial speech merits intermediate protection, parts two
through four of the test must be applied.147 The government’s passage of
parts two through four means that the commercial speech restriction does
not violate the First Amendment, whereas the government’s failure to
clear any hurdle posed by parts two through four means that the restriction
is unconstitutional.148
In part two, the Central Hudson test asks whether a substantial government interest underlies the commercial speech restriction.149 The
143

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760–63, 765, 769–70, 771 n.24. See Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (using the term “intermediate scrutiny” to refer to Court’s
analysis of restrictions on commercial speech). Misleading commercial speech would
suffer the same fate to which all commercial speech formerly had been subjected:
exclusion from the First Amendment’s protective scope. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 771. The same would be true of commercial speech pertaining to an unlawful
activity. Id.
144
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
145
Id. at 563–64, 566. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–72
(2011) (applying the Central Hudson test but also suggesting an alternative analysis);
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367–68 (2002) (applying the Central Hudson test). The test
survived even though some Justices expressed dissatisfaction with it or proposed that it
be modified or replaced in order to enhance protection for commercial speech. See
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at
484, 496–500, 501–04, 507–08; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 431, 433–38 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
146
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. This part of the test has its roots in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, which recognized intermediate First Amendment protection for
nonmisleading commercial speech about a lawful activity but denied protection to
commercial expression that misleads or promotes something illegal. Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760–63, 765, 769–70, 771 n.24.
147
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
148
Id. at 563–64, 566.
149
Id. at 566.
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government normally has little difficulty passing part two because the
cases have indicated that almost any interest related to the public’s
health, safety, or welfare will suffice.150 Indeed, part two is nearly a
given for the government.
The same cannot be said, however, of parts three and four, which focus on the relationship—or “fit”—between the commercial speech restriction and the substantial interest the government seeks to further.151
Part three requires the government to demonstrate that the challenged
commercial speech regulation will directly advance the government’s
underlying interest.152 To prove direct advancement, the government must
show that the regulation will meaningfully contribute to the fulfillment of
its interest.153 A trivial or attenuated connection between regulation and
government interest is insufficient.154
In part four, the Central Hudson test requires the government to show
that the challenged commercial speech restriction is no more extensive
than necessary to fulfill the underlying regulatory interest.155 Central Hudson itself and early applications of its test suggested that part four contemplated a least-restrictive-means analysis, under which a commercial
speech regulation could pass muster only if it restricted absolutely the
least amount of speech possible.156 A later decision instead established
that the no-more-extensive-than-necessary formulation of part four requires only that the restriction be “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.”157 Part four thus contemplates a “reasonable” fit between

150

See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368–70 (finding substantial interests in both
preserving effectiveness of federal drug approval process and ensuring availability of
compounded drugs to persons needing them); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 504
(finding a substantial interest in reducing public’s alcohol consumption); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (finding a substantial interest in guarding against
alcohol “strength wars”); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69 (finding a substantial interest
in promoting energy conservation).
151
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64, 566.
152
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
153
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993).
154
See id. at 770–71; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
155
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64, 566.
156
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 569–71; Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 73–75 (1983).
157
Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see id. at 476–
78, 480 (labeling as dicta earlier decisions’ indications that part four of the test requires a
least-restrictive-means analysis). But see id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing
that, in order to conclude that part four does not require a least-restrictive-means analysis,
the majority had to “recast[] a good bit of contrary language in our past cases”).
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commercial speech restriction and underlying government interest, not
necessarily a “perfect” fit.158
B. Narrowing of the Gap Between Intermediate and Full Protection
Virginia Board of Pharmacy’s basic principle, that commercial speech
can receive First Amendment protection but at most an intermediate degree
thereof, remains in force, as does the related Central Hudson test.159 The
rigor with which the Supreme Court applies parts three and four of the test
serves as the key determiner of what intermediate First Amendment protection really means in relation to full protection.160 In various pre-1995
applications of the test, the Court made intermediate protection appear
significant by holding the government’s feet to the fire.161 Yet sometimes
158

Id. at 480. Accordingly, a commercial speech restriction that is not absolutely the
narrowest one possible may still clear the part-four hurdle as long as that restriction is not
unreasonably broad in its prohibition of speech. See id. at 477, 480. It remains important to
explore other steps that the government might have taken and that would have furthered the
underlying regulatory interest just as well without restricting as much (or any) speech. E.g.,
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372–73 (2002); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–
91. Fox’s narrow-tailoring gloss seemed to be designed to make part four of the test easier
for government to pass than if that part contemplated a least-restrictive-means analysis. See
Fox, 492 U.S. at 477. As will be seen, however, the Court’s more recent decisions have
applied the narrow-tailoring standard in a way that makes part four a difficult obstacle for
the government to overcome. See infra text accompanying notes 164–263.
159
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–72 (2011); Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367–68 (2002); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183–92, 193–94 (1999) (all applying Central Hudson test).
But see Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662–67 (suggesting an alternative analysis not dependent
on the Central Hudson test). The Central Hudson test has survived even though some
Justices have expressed reservations about it. See infra notes 174, 182.
160
As will be seen, a stern application of parts three and four of the Central Hudson
test makes the test more difficult for the government to pass, enhances the likelihood that
the commercial speech restriction at issue will be invalidated, and makes the intermediate
level of First Amendment protection significant. On the other hand, a loose application
that defers to the government’s judgments regarding the fit between the restriction and
the underlying government interest makes the restriction more likely to be upheld and
causes the intermediate level of First Amendment protection to seem less meaningful. See
infra text accompanying notes 161–64.
161
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–71 (striking down regulation that prohibited
utility companies from advertising public power services because regulation prohibited
significantly more speech than was necessary to further energy conservation interest);
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71–75 (striking down federal law that prohibited unsolicited mailings of
advertisements for contraceptives because law would do little to further interest in helping
parents control how and when children would be exposed to sensitive subjects and because
the law restricted far more speech than was necessary to serve that interest); City of
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the Court displayed little inclination to second-guess the government’s
regulatory choices.162
From 1995 on, however, the Court has consistently employed a stern
analysis that carefully scrutinizes the relationship between the commercial
speech regulation at issue and the underlying government interest.163 As the
following discussion will reveal, those decisions have made parts three and
four of the Central Hudson test very formidable obstacles for the government to overcome and have effectively given commercial speech a level of
protection not far removed from the full variety even though the level still
carries the intermediate label.164
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,165 a 1995 decision, launched the current era
in which the gap between intermediate and full First Amendment protection
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417–18, 424–25, 428, 430 (1993)
(invalidating a city ordinance requiring removal of racks devoted to commercial advertising
publications because the ordinance would do little to advance the city’s interests in safety
and aesthetics and because other available regulatory options would have restricted less
speech); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763–64, 767, 768–73 (invalidating a Florida rule
that barred CPAs from personal solicitation of potential clients because the government
offered only speculation regarding whether rule would advance interests in preventing fraud
and coercion and in enhancing auditor independence).
162
For instance, in Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986), the Court upheld a Puerto Rico law that banned commercial advertisements for
casino gambling if the advertisements were directed toward residents and citizens of
Puerto Rico. Id. at 330–33, 344, 348. The Court so held even though casino gambling
was a lawful activity in Puerto Rico. Id. In applying parts three and four of the Central
Hudson test, the Court paid great deference to the government’s regulatory judgments.
The Court observed that it was in no position to second-guess the government’s
conclusion that the advertising ban would directly further the government’s interest in
protecting residents and citizens against the evils of casino gambling and would do so
without restricting far too much speech. Id. at 341–44; see Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477–80 (1989) (expressing concern that the applicable test
should not be made too difficult for government to pass, given that commercial speech
receives intermediate, rather than full, protection); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509
U.S. 418, 427–31 (1993) (displaying deference to congressional regulatory choices in
enacting a lottery advertising statute meant to accommodate interests of states that
permitted lotteries and states that did not permit them). As will be seen, the Court’s more
recent applications of the Central Hudson test neither display deference to the
government’s regulatory choices nor voice concern about making the test too difficult for
the government to pass. See infra notes 165–263.
163
See infra text accompanying notes 165–263.
164
Recent years’ decisions thus have gone a long way toward accomplishing, within
the existing framework, the underlying objectives of those Justices who advocated
changing the governing rules in order to provide greater protection to commercial speech.
See infra notes 174, 182.
165
514 U.S. 476 (1995).
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has been narrowing. In Coors, the Court struck down a federal statute and
related regulations that prohibited disclosures of alcohol content on beer
labels.166 Justice Thomas’s majority opinion acknowledged that in seeking
to prevent “strength wars” among alcohol producers and guard against the
negative public health effects that could result from such wars, the government possessed substantial interests for purposes of the Central Hudson test’s second element.167 However, the Court concluded that the ban
on disclosing alcohol content on beer labels would not directly advance
the prevention-of-strength-wars and public-health interests, in large part
because the ban would be undercut by other federal regulations that permitted alcohol content disclosures in many advertisements and that even
required such disclosures on some alcohol product labels.168
Turning to the Central Hudson test’s final element, the Coors Court
concluded that the commercial speech restriction at issue was not narrowly
tailored.169 The ban on disclosing alcohol content on labels prohibited far
more speech than was reasonably necessary, including even disclosures
that certain products would have a lesser alcohol content than others.170 In
addition, the Court thought the government could have taken other steps
that would have furthered its interests just as well as or better than the
label restriction and would have done so without prohibiting speech.171
For instance, it could have guarded against strength wars by mandating
limits on the alcohol content permitted for beers.172 The government thus
made a problematic choice, the Court indicated, in opting to regulate
speech instead of the relevant product or activity.173

166

Id. at 478, 486–91.
Id. at 482, 485, 491. The government did not want to see beer makers increase the
alcohol content of their products and compete with each other on the basis of everincreasing alcohol strengths. See id.
168
Id. at 488. The Court regarded the government’s regulatory regime as riddled by
“overall irrationality” and as therefore unlikely to do anything meaningful to further the
government’s objectives. Id. The government’s mere speculation about the possible
effects of the commercial speech restriction was not enough to enable the government to
carry its burden under part three of the applicable test. Id. at 488–90.
169
Id. at 491.
170
See id. at 490–91. Such information would be useful to those who might want a
beverage containing less alcohol rather than more—presumably a good thing from a
public health perspective. See id.
171
Id. at 490–91.
172
Id.
173
See id. This same concern about using speech restrictions to effect desired changes
regarding products, activities, or behaviors shows up in other decisions to be discussed.
See infra notes 178–79, 186, 231–32.
167
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A year after Coors, the Court considered a First Amendment-based
challenge to a Rhode Island law that prohibited alcohol sellers from advertising the prices they would charge. Speaking through a principal opinion
and three concurrences in the judgment, all nine Justices agreed in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island that the law could not stand.174 Eight
Justices concluded that the government had failed the “fit” portions of the
Central Hudson test.175 None displayed any inclination to defer to the
government when determining the constitutionality of the advertising
restriction at issue or of commercial speech restrictions in general.176
In 44 Liquormart, Rhode Island failed part three of the applicable test
because the Court saw nothing more than a tenuous, speculative relationship
between the price advertising ban and the underlying government interest in

174

517 U.S. 484, 489, 497–514 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined at times by
Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., and at times by Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.);
id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 528–32
(O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring). Justice Stevens’s opinion
spoke for only a plurality rather than a majority because some Justices were unwilling to
subscribe to a portion of the opinion in which Justice Stevens proposed to alter the
commercial speech framework by subjecting certain restrictions to the Central Hudson test
and others to a somewhat higher level of scrutiny. See id. at 496–508, 509–14; id. at 517
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 528–32 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). For discussion and analysis of the framework changes Justice Stevens
proposed in 44 Liquormart, see Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of
Posadas and the Birth of Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44
Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 518–34, 542–53 (1997). Justices Scalia and O’Connor
premised their 44 Liquormart opinions on the view that there was no need to re-work
existing commercial speech analysis in order to decide the case at hand. See 517 U.S. at
517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 528–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Although he
concluded that the Rhode Island law should be invalidated, Justice Thomas did not join
the majority opinion because he favored a complete scrapping of the Central Hudson test.
See id. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
175
See 517 U.S. at 504–08; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 528–32
(O’Connor, J., concurring). For a listing of which Justices joined the majority opinion
and which joined the O’Connor opinion, see supra note 174. In his concurrence in the
judgment, Justice Thomas did not apply the Central Hudson test because he proposed to
drop it entirely and devise a means of providing enhanced protection for commercial
speech. See 517 U.S. at 518–28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
176
See 517 U.S. at 496–514; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 518–28 (Thomas,
J., concurring); id. at 528–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Most members of the Court
voiced disapproval of a 1986 decision in which the Court’s application of parts three and
four of the controlling test had involved paying great deference to the government’s
regulatory choices. See id. at 508–14; id. at 531–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The 1986
decision was Posadas. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986); see supra text accompanying note 162.
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reducing alcohol consumption.177 Moreover, Rhode Island failed part four
because it could have furthered its interest in promoting temperance through
various other ways that did not involve what the Court considered a sweeping speech restriction.178 By listing non-utilized avenues that would have
involved regulating alcohol sales without restricting speech, the 44 Liquormart Court again appeared to indicate that challenged speech restrictions
would likely trigger judicial concern if the government had not first attempted seemingly feasible regulation of the underlying product or activity.179
A 1999 decision, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United
States,180 featured unanimity on the outcome and near-unanimity on the
rationale.181 The Court held that a federal statute banning broadcast advertisements for gambling activities could not constitutionally be applied to
casino gambling advertisements aired by radio and television stations that
were located in a state where such gambling was lawful.182 Again rigorously
177

See 517 U.S. at 505–07; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 529–32
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting Rhode Island’s argument that if price advertising
were banned, alcohol prices would stay higher than they otherwise would be, that the
higher prices would lead to less alcohol consumption by the public, and that public health
would therefore be improved).
178
Id. at 507; id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). For instance,
Rhode Island could have sought to further its temperance-promotion objective by
increasing taxes on alcohol products, limiting quantities of alcohol that could be
purchased, or launching enhanced educational campaigns regarding the dangers of
excessive alcohol consumption. Id. at 507.
179
See id. at 503–04, 507; id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 526 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As Professor Stern has noted, “[t]he
splintered opinions in 44 Liquormart should not obscure the fact that this decision
heralded a more protective attitude toward commercial speech.” Nat Stern, In Defense of
the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 72 (1999). For
further analysis of 44 Liquormart, see Langvardt & Richards, supra note 174, at 518–58.
180
527 U.S. 173 (1999).
181
Id. at 176.
182
Id. at 176, 195–96. Justice Stevens, who had proposed altering the commercial
speech framework in 44 Liquormart and ended up with only a plurality opinion there, see
supra note 174, authored the majority opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting.
After acknowledging that some members of the Court (himself included) had expressed
views about how the commercial speech analysis might be modified in order to enhance
First Amendment protection for commercial speech, Justice Stevens went on to disclaim
any intent to make such proposals this time because the existing principles associated
with the Central Hudson test were more than adequate to decide the case. 527 U.S. at
184. The more modest approach won Justice Stevens seven more votes for his opinion,
id. at 175, with only Justice Thomas not joining it. Although Justice Thomas believed
that the statute at issue should be invalidated, he merely concurred in the judgment
because he could not put aside his contempt for the Central Hudson framework. Id. at
197 (Thomas, J., concurring).

2014] TOBACCO ADVERTISING & THE FIRST AMENDMENT

363

applying the Central Hudson test, the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Court concluded that even if the government possessed substantial interests in guarding against the social ills associated with casino gambling and
in assisting states that have chosen not to make such gambling lawful, the
government failed parts three and four of the test.183 The Court questioned
the soundness of the government’s part-three argument that the advertising
ban bore a direct relationship to the interests underlying it.184 In addition,
the Court observed that the advertising ban and the regulatory regime of
which it was a part contained exceptions and inconsistencies that would
tend to undermine whatever limited ability the ban might otherwise have
had to advance the government’s purposes.185
As for part four of the controlling test, the Court faulted the government for having chosen a sweeping speech restriction when regulatory
courses of action not involving speech could have been employed in an
effort to further the government’s objectives.186 Given the secondguessing of Congress in which the Court appeared quite willing to engage,
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting offered added indications of a narrowing gap between intermediate and full First Amendment protection.187
C. The Lorillard Decision: Narrowing of the Gap Continues
The Court’s next commercial speech case, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,188 served as its first, and still only, decision on whether restrictions
on tobacco advertising and promotion violate the First Amendment.189 The
challenged Massachusetts regulations dealt with sales of and advertisements for cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars.190 The regulations
183

527 U.S. at 183, 185–96.
See id. at 188–89.
185
Id. at 190–95.
186
Id. at 192–93. For instance, the government could have sought to combat the social
ills associated with casino gambling by banning gambling on credit, restricting the use of
cash machines on casino premises, limiting pot and bet sizes, restricting casino locations,
or imposing certain licensing requirements. Id. at 192. The Court noted that although the
“failure [of Congress] to institute ... direct regulation of private casino gambling does not
necessarily compromise the constitutionality of [the advertising ban], it does undermine
the asserted justifications for the restriction before us.” Id. Even if direct regulation of the
underlying activity is not a mandatory prerequisite to implementation of a speech
restriction, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting suggested a strong preference for trying
direct regulation first. See id. at 192–93.
187
See id. at 188–96.
188
533 U.S. 525 (2001).
189
See id. at 553.
190
Id. at 552.
184
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reflected protection-of-minors purposes: to restrict underage consumers’
access to tobacco products; and to lessen the prospect that advertisements
would induce underage persons to use such products.191
Sales-practices regulations at issue in Lorillard prohibited retailers
from using self-service displays of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, or cigars, and required that tobacco products be located where consumers
could obtain them only with assistance from a store clerk.192 The regulations also imposed advertising restrictions, including a provision barring
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of tobacco products from using
outdoor advertising in any location within 1000 feet of a public playground, playground area in a public park, or elementary or secondary
school.193 In addition, the regulations restricted point-of-sale promotion by
providing that if advertising for tobacco products appeared inside a retail
establishment within the requisite 1000-foot radius, no portion of the advertising could be placed lower than five feet from the floor.194
As noted earlier in the Article, the Lorillard Court devoted much of its
attention to a determination that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted most of the Massachusetts regulations insofar as they
pertained to cigarette advertising.195 The Court therefore found it necessary to conduct a First Amendment analysis only in regard to the state
regulations’ application to smokeless tobacco and cigar advertising and
promotion.196 With a five-Justice majority striking down nearly all of the
regulations as so applied,197 the decision left little doubt that the application of the restrictions to cigarette advertising also would have failed to
pass First Amendment muster if the application to cigarette advertising
had not already succumbed to preemption.198

191

533 U.S. at 532–34. Manufacturers and retailers of tobacco products filed the
constitutional challenge. Id. at 532.
192
Id. at 534.
193
Id. at 534–36. This prohibition also applied to advertising in enclosed stadiums and
advertising within a retail establishment if the advertising was directed toward or visible
from the area outside the establishment, assuming the stadium or establishment was
located within the just-described 1000-foot radius. Id.
194
Id. at 535–36.
195
Id. at 540–53; see supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
196
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 553. As noted earlier, federal law then in existence did not
contemplate a preemption argument concerning the state restrictions’ application to
tobacco products other than cigarettes. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
197
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561–66. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O’Connor (the author of the majority), Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at
532, 561, 561–66.
198
See id. at 556–70.
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Justice O’Connor began the First Amendment portion of the Lorillard majority opinion by emphasizing that the Central Hudson test,
and especially its third and fourth parts, would control the analysis.199 No
issue arose concerning whether Massachusetts possessed a substantial
underlying regulatory interest because none of the challenging parties
disputed the significance of the government’s interest in curtailing tobacco
use by minors.200 Later in its analysis, the Court labeled this interest as
“substantial, and even compelling.”201
Six Justices agreed that Massachusetts had passed part three of the
applicable test in regard to the outdoor advertising restrictions.202 Writing for the six-Justice group, Justice O’Connor approvingly noted “the
theory that product advertising stimulates demand for products, while
suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect.”203 The six Justices
also agreed that Massachusetts had appropriately relied on National Cancer Institute statistics and on FDA studies regarding the extent of, and
possible influences on, minors’ uses of tobacco products.204 Because the
199

Id. at 553–55 (rejecting an argument that strict scrutiny should control the analysis,
the Court saw no need to break new analytical ground in order to resolve the case).
200
Id. at 555.
201
Id. at 564. Still later, in a concluding portion of the majority opinion subscribed to
by the five Justices who invalidated nearly all of the Massachusetts regulations, the Court
added the observation with which this Article began: that “‘tobacco use, particularly
among children and adolescents, poses perhaps the single most significant threat to public
health in the United States.’” Id. at 570 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)).
202
Id. at 557–61. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer concluded that Massachusetts had passed the third part of the
controlling test. Id. at 556–61. Of those six Justices, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O’Connor were part of the five-Justice majority that ultimately struck down most
of the advertising restrictions on the ground that Massachusetts had not passed part four
of the test. Id. at 532, 561–66. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were the other three
in the majority that held the government had failed part four. Id.; see id. at 571 (Kennedy
& Scalia, JJ., concurring); id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). Given what they regarded
as the government’s obvious failure to pass part four of the test, Justices Kennedy and
Scalia saw no need for the Court to decide whether the government passed part three.
They also noted “continuing concerns that the [Central Hudson] test gives insufficient
protection to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech,” and cited those concerns as a
reason not to agree with the Court’s application of part three of the test. Id. at 571–72
(Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring). Justice Thomas made no specific mention of part
three. He noted only that the government had not met its burden under the Central
Hudson test and went on to explain at length why he favored jettisoning that test in favor
of applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on truthful commercial speech. See id. at 572
(Thomas, J., concurring).
203
Id. at 557.
204
See id. at 557–60.
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state had furnished “ample documentation of the problem with underage
use” of tobacco products, the Court held that the state’s “decision to
regulate advertising ... in an effort to combat the use of tobacco products
by minors” reflected a close enough relationship to satisfy the directadvancement element of the controlling test.205
The government’s success in Lorillard stopped there, however, as a
five-Justice majority largely different from the six-Justice group that had
resolved the direct-advancement element in the government’s favor concluded that the outdoor advertising restrictions did not comply with the
Central Hudson test’s final element.206 Justice O’Connor and the four
colleagues who joined this portion of her opinion emphasized that the
disallowance of advertising within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds,
when coupled with local zoning regulations of general applicability, would
result in an inability of tobacco manufacturers and other sellers to engage
in outdoor advertising in approximately ninety percent of the geographic
area in certain cities.207 The outdoor advertising restrictions thus constituted “nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information
about smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers.”208
Continuing with a part-four analysis that revealed a clear willingness
to second-guess the government’s regulatory choices, the five-Justice
majority stressed that the state had not made a “careful calculation of the
speech interests involved.”209 For instance, the Massachusetts regulations
had not targeted “particular advertising and promotion practices that appeal to youth,” as supposedly identified in relevant studies.210 In addition,
the Court expressed concern that given the broad definition of advertising
in the regulations, even a retailer’s oral communications with a would-be
purchaser of tobacco products would violate the regulations if those communications occurred outdoors.211 Hence, the outdoor advertising restrictions, rather than being narrowly tailored to the protection-of-minors
205

Id. at 561.
For the relevant lineups of the Justices, see supra text accompanying note 202.
207
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561–63.
208
Id. at 562. The Court did not note that this “nearly … complete ban” applied only
to outdoor advertising and not to such avenues of truthful communication as newspaper
and magazine advertisements.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 563.
211
Id. In noting this example, the Court invoked what would seem an atypical
application of a regulation designed mainly to address advertisements in signs and
billboards. See id. at 534–35, 536 (discussing Massachusetts regulations). With such an
example helping to support a conclusion that the regulations were not narrowly tailored,
the Court appeared to apply part four of the controlling test with considerable rigor.
206
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interest, prohibited too much speech that adults would be entitled to receive.212 Those restrictions therefore violated the First Amendment.213
The regulations’ point-of-sale advertising restrictions (the ones calling
for in-store advertising to be placed at least five feet off the floor) fared
even worse in Lorillard. The five Justices who agreed to strike down the
outdoor advertising restrictions were joined by a sixth Justice in holding
that the point-of-sale restrictions did not directly advance the government’s underlying interest and were more extensive than necessary to
further that interest.214
Lorillard’s preemption and First Amendment-based rulings gutted the
Massachusetts regulations except for the sales practices restrictions (the
ban on retail outlets’ use of self-service displays of cigarettes, smokeless
tobacco, and cigars, and the related requirement that consumers not have
access to such items without the assistance of store personnel).215 Even
assuming that those largely conduct-related provisions implicated speech
interests sufficiently to warrant consideration of freedom of expression
principles, the sales practices restrictions were held permissible under the
First Amendment because they would directly further the government’s
interest in restricting underage users’ access to tobacco products and were
a suitably narrow means of doing so.216 Although the sales practices restrictions survived, it would be disingenuous to characterize Lorillard as
anything other than a resounding victory for the tobacco companies. Especially through the Court’s rigorous application of part four of the Central
Hudson test, Lorillard signaled that the intermediate protection for commercial speech might not be much different from the full protection extended to noncommercial expression.217

212

Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 562–64. The Court emphasized that despite the “substantial, and even
compelling” nature of the interest in protecting minors, the government is not free to go
overboard in restricting speech that adults have an interest in receiving. Id. at 564. The
four Justices who dissented from the Court’s holding regarding part four would have
remanded for further fact-finding regarding potential effects of the outdoor advertising
restrictions and regarding other avenues of communication still available to sellers of
tobacco products. Id. at 601–03 (Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 590 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214
Id. at 532, 566–67. Justice Souter provided the sixth vote on these issues. Id. at 590.
215
Id. at 569–70.
216
Id. at 567–70.
217
See id. at 561–66, 570–71.
213
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D. Post-Lorillard Decisions: Greater Enhancement of Commercial Speech
Protection
A year after Lorillard, the Court decided Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center.218 There, en route to striking down an advertising restriction
set forth in a federal statute, a five-Justice majority applied the Central Hudson test strictly against the government219—“too strictly,” according to the
four dissenting Justices.220 The advertising restriction at issue in Western
States appeared in the compounded drugs sections of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).221 Compounded
drugs are produced by pharmacists who combine, mix, or alter ingredients in
order to serve the particular needs of patients.222 Unlike drugs produced and
sold on a widespread basis by pharmaceutical companies, compounded drugs
are made available only on a special-needs, and usually small-scale, basis.223
Because it would not be economically feasible for pharmacists who
produce compounded drugs to complete the clinical trials necessitated by
the usual requirement that drugs receive pre-market approval from the
FDA, a requirement that compounded drugs receive FDA approval could
lead many pharmacists to decide not to engage in compounding. Therefore, in an effort to keep compounded drugs available for those who need
them but do so in a way that would not undermine the purposes of the
generally applicable FDA approval requirement,224 Congress provided in
FDAMA that compounded drugs would not need FDA approval if pharmacists providing them adhered to several limitations.225 Under one of
these limitations, pharmacists could not advertise particular compounded
drugs that they furnish, though they could advertise the more general fact
218

535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Id. at 360. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion. Id. at 359. As she had done in her Lorillard majority
opinion, Justice O’Connor noted that some Justices had expressed dissatisfaction with the
Central Hudson test over the years but that the test would be adequate for resolution of
the issues in Western States. Id. at 367–68; see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 554–55 (2001).
220
Western States, 535 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens & Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting).
221
Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 127, § 503A(c), 111 Stat. 2296, 2330 (1997) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353a(c) (Supp. I 1997)); Western States, 535 U.S. at 357.
222
Pub. L. No. 105-115, sec. 127, § 503A(a), 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a) (Supp. I 1997)); Western States, 535 U.S. at 360–61.
223
Western States, 535 U.S. at 360–61.
224
See id. at 368–69.
225
FDAMA sec. 127, § 503A(a), 111 Stat. at 2328; Western States, 535 U.S. at 364.
219
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that they provide a compounding service.226 Pharmacists who wished to
advertise particular compounded drugs challenged this limitation as a First
Amendment violation.227
Part four of the Central Hudson test would be the government’s undoing in Western States.228 The Court identified “non-speech-related means
of drawing a line between compounding and large-scale manufacturing,”229 and faulted the government for “not [having] offered any reason
why [these] possibilities, alone or in combination, would be insufficient to
prevent compounding from occurring on such a scale as to undermine the
new drug approval process.”230 Making more explicit previous decisions’
suggestion that the government must ordinarily try regulating the underlying activity before regulating speech concerning the activity,231 the Court
stated that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort. Yet here it seems to have
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”232
226

Id. sec. 127, § 503A(c), 111 Stat. at 2330; Western States, 535 U.S. at 364–65.
Western States, 535 U.S. at 365.
228
See id. at 371–73. The Court conceded in Western States that, for purposes of part
two of the controlling Central Hudson test, the government possessed sufficiently
important public health and safety interests. Id. at 369–70. The Court also indicated that it
would assume, without deciding, the soundness of the government’s argument that the
advertising restriction would help to keep compounded drugs services from becoming
large-scale endeavors and would thus directly advance the government’s interests in
keeping such drugs available without creating a potentially huge exception to the FDA
approval requirement. See id. at 371.
229
Id. at 372.
230
Id. at 373. The Court also expressed its disapproval of “the notion that the
Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial
information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with
the information.” Id. at 374.
231
See supra text accompanying notes 179–80, 187.
232
Western States, 535 U.S. at 373. In a forceful dissent joined by three other Justices,
Justice Breyer stressed that Congress needed to be able to restrict drug-compounders’
commercial speech to the extent it did in order to achieve its public health and safety
goals. Id. at 378, 384 (Breyer, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
He listed the non-speech-related alternatives identified by the Western States majority
and explained why each one would be either unfeasible or ineffective. See id. at 385–86.
With the Court having “too readily assume[d] the existence of practical alternatives” to
the advertising restriction, Justice Breyer faulted the Court for having “applie[d] the
commercial speech doctrine too strictly.” Id. at 388. Justice Breyer supplemented this
criticism with a warning about what he saw happening in the Court’s commercial speech
decisions:
[T]he Constitution demands a more lenient application ... that ... distinguishes between commercial speech and other forms of speech demanding stricter constitutional protection. Otherwise, an overly rigid
227
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The Court’s most recent commercial speech decision, Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.,233 further illustrates the trend of enhancing commercial
speech protection through pro-advertising, anti-regulation applications of
the Court’s precedents.234 Sorrell involved an attack on a Vermont statute
dealing with pharmacy records that contained information on physicians’
individual histories of prescribing medications (referred to here as “prescriber-identifying information”).235 The statute established a general rule
that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information, though this general rule was subject to exceptions.236 In addition,
the law barred pharmacies from disclosing prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes and prohibited pharmaceutical companies
from making marketing-related uses of such information.237
Justice Kennedy eliminated any suspense about how the Court would
rule by noting in the first paragraph of his opinion for a six-Justice majority that the Vermont law targeted “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing, ... a form of expression protected by the ... First Amendment.”238
This meant, according to the opening paragraph, that the statute “must be
subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny”—a standard that the statute
“cannot satisfy.”239
The Court noted the Vermont law’s impairment of “detailing,” a practice
in which pharmaceutical companies’ sales representatives call on physicians
in an effort to persuade them to prescribe particular medications.240 Detailing
is more effective, the Court noted, when the sales representative knows the
relevant physicians’ prescription histories and practices because the representative can then more readily determine which physicians are likely to be

commercial speech doctrine will transform what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and
safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting
the legislature from enacting necessary protections.
Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).
233
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
234
See id. at 2671; see also supra text accompanying notes 164–232 (discussion of
earlier decisions illustrating same trend). As will be seen, Sorrell added a possible new
wrinkle to the analysis of certain commercial speech cases. See infra text accompanying
notes 245–50.
235
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2653, 2656.
236
Id. at 2656.
237
Id. at 2659–60.
238
Id. at 2659. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and
Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy in the majority. Id. at 2658–59.
239
Id. at 2659.
240
Id.
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interested in certain drugs and can tailor a sales message accordingly.241 The
prescriber-identifying information that is so useful to the sales representatives
usually comes to them by way of data miners—companies that purchase
prescriber-identifying information from pharmacies, analyze the information,
and produce reports on which detailers rely in developing their sales pitches.242 Vermont contended that the statute’s restrictions on marketing-related
sales, disclosures, and uses of prescriber-identifying information were designed to protect medical privacy interests, to shield physicians from harassing sales behaviors by pharmaceutical representatives, and to lessen the
likelihood that drug makers’ marketing efforts would lead to decisions to
prescribe unnecessary or expensive medications.243
For the Court, the statute’s marketing-themed restrictions were problematic because the statute also contained exceptions to the general rule
restricting sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.244
Although marketing-related dissemination and uses of such information
were prohibited, the statute permitted the information to be released and
used for various other purposes (including research, educational, and law
enforcement purposes, as well as purposes connected with a state program
meant to provide physicians information on therapeutic, cost-effective
generic alternatives to brand-name drugs).245 According to the Court, these
exceptions to the general rule, when considered alongside the statute’s ban
on marketing-related dissemination and uses, meant that the statute restricted speech on the bases of content and speaker.246 The statute “disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content. More than that,
[it] disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”247

241

Id. at 2659–60. Because detailing is expensive, drug companies use it mostly to
promote the sale of brand-name drugs that are still under patent protection and therefore
are likely to be higher-priced and particularly profitable. Id. at 2660.
242
Id. Data miners and an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers launched the
First Amendment-based challenge to the Vermont statute. Id. at 2661.
243
Id. at 2659, 2668–70. In findings that accompanied the statute, Vermont’s legislature
concluded that detailing increases healthcare and health insurance costs and encourages
overly extensive reliance on new brand-name drugs as opposed to less expensive generic
alternatives with established track records. The findings also revealed an apparent
legislative intent to make detailing less effective by restricting the use of prescriberidentifying information. Id. at 2661, 2663, 2671.
244
Id. at 2663.
245
Id. at 2660–61.
246
Id. at 2663.
247
Id. Elaborating on this point, the Court noted that “detailers cannot obtain prescriberidentifying information, even though the information may be ... acquired by other speakers
with diverse purposes and viewpoints,” and that detailers “are likewise barred from using
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The Sorrell majority concluded that the Vermont statute’s disfavoring of
marketing-motivated speakers and marketing-oriented messages should
trigger “heightened scrutiny”—an analytical standard the First Amendment
requires when the government regulates speech “‘because of disagreement
with the message it conveys.’”248 The Court cited mainly noncommercial
speech cases for the heightened scrutiny proposition, but stated that
“[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”249 Although the Court did not explain the specifics of the heightened scrutiny it had in mind, it cited another
noncommercial speech decision for the proposition that “[i]n the ordinary
case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-based and, in
practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”250 However, after noting Vermont’s
argument that the statute burdened only commercial speech, the Court stated
that it would apply the Central Hudson test for commercial speech restrictions because “the outcome is the same whether a special commercial
speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”251
In applying the Central Hudson test, the Sorrell majority acknowledged
that the government interests underlying the Vermont statute probably were
sufficiently substantial to satisfy part two of the test, but concluded that the
state failed the “fit” requirements established by the test’s final two parts.252
The statute’s ban on marketing-related disclosures and uses of prescriberidentifying information would not be likely to advance the medical privacy
interests asserted by the state, given that the statute provided for numerous
the information for marketing, even though the information may be used by a wide range of
other speakers.” Id.
248
Id. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
249
Id. Discovery Network contained statements dealing with the singling-out of
disfavored commercial content, but the Court did not invoke a heightened scrutiny
rationale in deciding the case. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 418–19 (1993). Rather, the Court relied on the Central Hudson test in deciding
Discovery Network. See id. at 417–18, 424–25, 428, 430–31.
250
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulatiosn are presumptively invalid.”)). This
statement and the supporting citation of a noncommercial speech decision could be read
as indicating that the heightened scrutiny the Court envisioned would afford protection
comparable to the full First Amendment protection normally extended to noncommercial
speech. See id. at 2667. For a discussion of full First Amendment protection, see supra
note 133 and accompanying text.
251
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (suggesting that the heightened scrutiny the Court had
been emphasizing would furnish potentially greater First Amendment protection than the
intermediate protection contemplated in the commercial speech line of cases, even if the
specific components of heightened scrutiny remain less than clearly defined).
252
See id. at 2668–70.
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exceptions under which such disclosures and uses of such information could
take place.253 Moreover, other means short of the ban on marketing-related
uses and disclosures could guard against supposed harassment of physicians
by sales representatives.254 The government also failed to demonstrate a
clear connection between the speech restrictions at issue and the state’s goals
of reducing health care costs and lessening the chances that unnecessary
medications would be prescribed.255 Finally, the Court expressed concern
about the statute’s effect of prohibiting marketing communications that
would provide helpful information and noted that the government cannot
legitimately restrict truthful speech simply because the government fears it
would be persuasive.256
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, dissented in order
to protest the Sorrell majority’s heightened scrutiny discussion and to emphasize that the Vermont statute’s effect on expression was “inextricably related
to a lawful government effort to regulate a commercial enterprise.”257 He
asserted that the Court had failed to distinguish between the “tight constraints” on government attempts to regulate noncommercial speech and the
“looser constraints when the government seeks to restrict ... commercial
speech ... or the regulation-related speech ... subject to a traditional regulatory program.”258 In addition, Justice Breyer worried that the heightened
scrutiny approach called for by the majority could jeopardize many
longstanding, highly detailed regulatory programs whose provisions contemplate speech oversight that is content-based or speaker-based.259 He
expressed the concern that “[a]t best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of

253

Id. at 2668.
Id. at 2669. For instance, physicians could simply refuse to meet with sales
representatives if they did not wish to meet with them. Id.
255
See id. at 2670.
256
Id. at 2670–71.
257
Id. at 2673 (Breyer, Ginsburg, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
258
Id. at 2673–74. Justice Breyer observed that “ordinary regulatory programs can
affect speech, particularly commercial speech, in myriad ways.” Id. at 2675. Therefore,
he continued, “to apply a ‘heightened’ First Amendment standard of review whenever
such a program burdens speech would transfer from legislatures to judges the primary
power to weigh ends and to choose means, threatening to distort or undermine legitimate
legislative objectives.” Id.
259
Id. at 2675–77. For instance, he noted, utility regulators typically oversee company
statements regarding electricity or other utility-related services, the Federal Reserve
Board reviews advertising and other statements by financial institutions, and the FDA
“oversees the form and content of labeling, advertising, and sales proposals of drugs, but
not of furniture.” Id. at 2677.
254
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First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that
may only incidentally affect a commercial message.”260
Sorrell indicates that some commercial speech restrictions—those that
prohibit using information to communicate certain messages or viewpoints
while simultaneously permitting uses of the same information to communicate favored messages or viewpoints—should be subjected to an asyet not clearly defined “heightened scrutiny.”261 It is important to note,
however, that the Court stopped short of mandating heightened scrutiny
for all commercial speech restrictions. Although the particular content and
viewpoint discrimination identified in Sorrell proved problematic, Justice
Kennedy noted that the interest in protecting consumers may permit the
government to regulate commercial speech more readily than noncommercial speech.262 The Court presumably would not have included such a
statement and would not have applied the Central Hudson test in deciding
260

Id. at 2685. Justice Breyer also offered an ominous warning about what the Court’s
analysis might suggest:
[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon
commercial messages, the Court’s vision of its reviewing task threatens
to return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation
for its interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power
was much abused and resulted in the constitutionalization of economic
theories preferred by individual jurists.
Id. at 2679. He then provided a cautionary citation to Justice Holmes’s dissent in the
long-discredited Lochner decision. Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). According to Justice Breyer, if the Court “[a]t best ...
opens [the] Pandora’s Box” identified earlier, it “[a]t worst ... reawakens Lochner’s pre–
New Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary
economic regulation is at issue.” Id. at 2685. To decide Sorrell, Justice Breyer would
have undertaken the less searching review applied to economic regulation that
incidentally affects speech—a form of review less rigorous than the intermediate
protection normally extended to commercial speech under Central Hudson. Id. at 2673,
2675, 2679. He added, however, his view that the Vermont statute would survive a
Central Hudson–focused analysis, given the state’s regulatory interests and the requisite
degree of fit shown to exist between the statute and those interests. Id. at 2681, 2683–85.
261
See id. at 2664–65. As will be seen, the Court’s heightened scrutiny comments are
potentially problematic if they are given a life after Sorrell. See infra text accompanying
notes 480–82; see also Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The
Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 48–51 (2012); Jennifer L. Pomeranz,
No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court’s Threat to Overhaul
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 420–22, 424–30, 432–34
(2012) (each criticizing Sorrell and forecasting problems if its heightened scrutiny
rationale takes hold).
262
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672. He also observed that Vermont “might have [had] a
stronger position” if its statute had more narrowly defined the circumstances in which
prescriber-identifying information could be used or disclosed. Id.
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the case if it had intended to use the case as a vehicle for obliterating the
First Amendment distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial speech.
Whatever one should make of Sorrell, it must be remembered that the
commercial speech decisions discussed in this section of the Article—
from Virginia Board of Pharmacy in 1976 through Sorrell in 2011—all
dealt with restrictions on commercial speech.263 Although those decisions
have indicated that the intermediate level of protection for commercial
speech is increasing in strength, there is another (and shorter) line of cases
indicating that the government has more latitude to require commercial
speech disclosures than to impose commercial speech restrictions.264 Because the cases dealing with required commercial speech disclosures hold
potential relevance to the tobacco advertising issues addressed in this
Article, the following subsection considers those decisions.
E. Commercial Speech Cases Dealing with Required Disclosures
A 1985 decision, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,265 was in part a case that could have been discussed in
an earlier subsection because it signaled that the intermediate level of First
Amendment protection operates as a significant check on governmentimposed commercial speech restrictions. Applying the Central Hudson test
in a pro-advertising manner,266 the Court held in Zauderer that sanctions
placed on an attorney could not constitutionally be based on his violation of
advertising restrictions267 set forth in Ohio bar disciplinary rules.268

263

See supra text accompanying notes 136–262.
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 230, 252
(2010); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-14, 717 (1977); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 755, 757,
762, 763, 765 (1976); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 645, 46
(1943).
265
471 U.S. at 626.
266
See id. at 637. The Court also noted that the Central Hudson test formed part of
“[o]ur general approach to restrictions on commercial speech”—an approach that “is ...
by now well settled.” Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
267
Zauderer violated a disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from offering
unsolicited legal advice and from accepting employment that resulted from offering
unsolicited advice. Id. at 633, 639. In addition, his advertisements contained information
other than the designated items of information permitted under another disciplinary rule.
Id. at 632–33. The advertisements also transgressed a rule that prohibited attorneys from
using illustrations and other visual elements in their advertisements. Id. at 632.
264
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Zauderer’s main significance, with regard to the commercial speech
doctrine, lies, however, in the part of the decision in which the Court
outlined the appropriate analytical treatment of government-required
disclosures in advertisements.269 An Ohio bar disciplinary rule at issue in
the case also required that if an attorney’s advertisement referred to contingent-fee rates on which the attorney would take cases, the advertisement
had to disclose that the client could still be liable for costs even if the client
lost the case and therefore owed no attorney’s fees under the contingent-fee
arrangement.270 Zauderer had failed to make such a disclosure in advertisements that made representations about contingent fees. The state maintained
that absent the required disclosure, the advertisements were deceptive.271
268

Id. at 644, 649. The State attempted to justify the disciplinary rules at issue as
prophylactic measures to prevent the deceptive, manipulative, and professionally
unbecoming advertising that, in the State’s view, would inevitably occur in the absence
of such restrictions. Id. at 633, 643–44. Disagreeing with the State’s inevitability premise,
the Court concluded that the disciplinary restrictions swept far too broadly by prohibiting
a great deal of advertising that would consist of truthful, non-deceptive, informative
content. Id. at 646–47. Turning to the State’s ban on the use of illustrations and visual
elements in attorneys’ advertisements, the Court classified such elements as important
and protected aids in attracting attention to, and communicating the content of, the
advertisements’ message. Id. at 647. “Accordingly,” the Court observed, “commercial
illustrations are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded verbal commercial
speech”—meaning that “restrictions on the use of visual media of expression in
advertising must survive scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.” Id. The restrictions did
not survive that scrutiny, as the Court rejected the State’s argument that its application of
the restriction to Zauderer’s accurate, non-misleading illustrations should be permitted
because other attorneys’ uses of illustrations might be deceptive or manipulative. Id. at
648–49. In language of potential importance to resolution of some of the tobacco
advertising issues addressed in this Article, the Zauderer Court stated that
[a]cceptance of the State’s argument would be tantamount to adoption of
the principle that a State may prohibit the use of pictures or illustrations
in connection with advertising of any product or service simply on the
strength of the general argument that the visual content of advertisements
may, under some circumstances, be deceptive or manipulative .... We
are not persuaded that identifying deceptive or manipulative uses of
visual media in advertising is so intrinsically burdensome that the State
is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the more convenient but far
more restrictive alternative of a blanket ban on the use of illustrations.
Id. at 649.
269
Id. at 651; see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 230, 252 (relying on
Zauderer as controlling precedent dealing with legal treatment to be given to required
commercial speech disclosures).
270
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631, 633.
271
Id. at 631, 633. As such, the advertisements also violated a separate rule prohibiting
attorneys from engaging in deceptive advertising. Id. at 633, 652.
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Rejecting Zauderer’s argument that the disclosure requirement should
trigger the Central Hudson test and the same intermediate scrutiny applied
to the state’s restrictions on advertising, the Court noted that the argument
“overlooks material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.”272 The disclosure requirement did not prevent
communication of information to the public; instead, the disclosure requirement “only required [advertising attorneys] to provide somewhat more
information than they might otherwise be inclined to present.”273 The
Court acknowledged having “held that in some instances compulsion to
speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on
speech,”274 citing Wooley v. Maynard275 and West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette276 as among the decisions with such a holding.277
But those decisions did not apply, the Zauderer majority stressed, because
“the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley ... and Barnette.”278 Rather than “attempt[ing] to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein,’”279 Ohio had “attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox
in commercial advertising….”280
Given that the value of the information provided in advertising served as
the key reason why First Amendment protection had been recognized for
commercial speech,281 the Court observed that Zauderer’s “constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his

272

Id. at 650.
Id.
274
Id.
275
430 U.S. 705, 714, 717 (1977).
276
319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943).
277
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
278
Id. at 651.
279
Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
280
Id. Moreover, Ohio merely required that Zauderer include “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” in his commercial advertisements. Id. The case therefore
would not be governed by the compelled speech decisions, which dealt with compulsion as
to noncommercial expression of an ideological nature. See id. In Wooley v. Maynard, for
instance, the Court held that New Hampshire could not prosecute a resident for having
covered up, on moral and religious grounds, the “Live Free or Die” motto on his car license
plates. 430 U.S. at 714, 717. In Barnette, the Court held that the State could not compel
objecting students to honor the flag with statements and salutes. 319 U.S. at 646.
281
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755, 757,
762–63, 765.
273
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advertising is minimal.”282 The Court noted that “because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do
flat prohibitions on speech,” its previous decisions had approved the use of
required warnings or disclaimers to guard against consumer confusion or
deception.283 In addition, the Court emphasized that its Central Hudsonguided decisions on commercial speech restrictions “have recommended
disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives
to actual suppression of speech.”284 Accordingly, the Zauderer majority
concluded that the Central Hudson test would be ill-fitting in the disclosure
requirements context.285
The Court observed that “unjustified or unduly burdensome” disclosure
requirements might chill commercial speech and therefore raise First
Amendment concerns, but went on to hold that “an advertiser’s rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the [government’s] interest in preventing deception of consumers.”286
This holding recognized that “the First Amendment interests implicated by
disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when
speech is actually suppressed ....”287 Accordingly, Zauderer’s disclosure
requirements test is less difficult—potentially much less difficult—for the
government to pass than is the Central Hudson test that applies when commercial speech restrictions are challenged.288
No current Justices were serving on the Court when Zauderer was decided.289 With the intermediate level of protection against commercial
speech restrictions having seemed to increase in strength during the years

282

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. The Court also observed that “[t]he right of a
commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not ... a
fundamental right” of the sort that should trigger strict scrutiny. Id. n.14. As the Court’s
analysis made plain, not even the intermediate scrutiny contemplated by the Central
Hudson test would be warranted. See id. at 650–51.
283
Id. at 651.
284
Id. at 651 n.14.
285
Id. at 650–51, 651 n.14.
286
Id. at 651–52 (finding the particular disclosure requirement at issue easily qualified
under the test the court enunciated because the requirement was reasonably related to the
interest in guarding against consumer deception and because the court saw it as neither
unduly burdensome nor likely to chill protected expression).
287
Id. at 651, 651 n.14.
288
See id. at 650–52. See also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559
U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (describing Zauderer’s disclosure requirements test as amounting to
“less exacting scrutiny” than the scrutiny contemplated by the Central Hudson test).
289
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.,
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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since Zauderer,290 would the current Court adhere to Zauderer’s disclosure requirements test and the lesser degree of First Amendment protection that it contemplates for advertisers when the government mandates
disclosures? The Court answered yes in a 2010 decision, Milavetz, Gallop
& Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.291
In Milavetz, the Court resolved a key foundational issue by determining that attorneys are “debt relief agencies” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.292 Therefore,
unless the First Amendment operated to nullify them, disclosure requirements imposed on debt relief agencies by § 528 of the statute would apply
to attorneys who advertise their bankruptcy services or advertise that they
will furnish assistance to persons struggling with credit or debt problems.
The disclosure requirements for bankruptcy services advertisements mandated inclusion of statements that the advertised services concerned
“bankruptcy relief” and that the advertiser was a debt relief agency.293
Similar disclosure requirements applied to advertisements for help with
credit or debt problems, with those advertisements also having to disclose
that “the assistance may involve bankruptcy relief.”294
The Milavetz law firm failed not only in its attempt to persuade the
Court that attorneys are not debt relief agencies but also in its First
Amendment challenge to § 528’s disclosure requirements.295 Writing for
all but one of her colleagues,296 Justice Sotomayor began the disclosure
requirements analysis by noting that “the challenged provisions regulate
only commercial speech.”297 Milavetz argued that the Central Hudson test
should provide the controlling framework, but the Court disagreed.298
Because § 528 was aimed at misleading commercial speech and set forth
290

See supra text accompanying notes 164–262.
559 U.S. 229 (2010).
292
Id. at 231–32, 235–36; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, sec. 226, §§ 101(3), 101(12A), 119 Stat. 23, 66–67
(2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(3), 101(12A) (2006)).
293
BAPACPA, sec. 229, § 528(a)(4), 111 Stat. at 71 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) (2006)).
294
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 233 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 528(b)(2)(A)
(2006)).
295
559 U.S. at 235–36, 249–53.
296
Id. at 231–32, 235–36, 255 (resolving the attorneys-as-debt-relief-agencies issue in a
nine-Justice majority opinion). Eight of the nine joined the disclosure requirements portion
of the opinion. Id. at 231. In a partial concurrence in the judgment, Justice Thomas offered a
different rationale for why the disclosure requirements did not violate the First Amendment.
Id. at 255 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
297
Id. at 249 (majority opinion).
298
Id.
291
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“disclosure requirement[s] rather than an affirmative limitation on speech,
... the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer governs our review.”299
The Milavetz Court noted Zauderer’s statement that in the commercial
speech setting, an advertiser has only a “minimal” constitutionally protected
interest in not furnishing the relevant factual information required by law.300
Observing that the required disclosures at issue resembled the required
disclosures in Zauderer, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that in each case the
government sought to “combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements” by requiring disclosures that called only for accurate statements of relevance to the services being advertised.301 Congress
had determined that absent a disclosure of the possible role of bankruptcy in
the debt relief assistance being advertised, such advertisements could
mislead consumers.302 The Court, therefore, concluded that § 528’s disclosure requirements were “‘reasonably related to the [Government’s] interest
in preventing deception of consumers’” and were constitutionally permissible under Zauderer.303
Milavetz’s reaffirmation of Zauderer holds considerable significance
because Milavetz was a nearly unanimous decision in which all but one of
the current Justices participated.304 The “less exacting scrutiny”305 called
for by the two decisions therefore continues to apply when the government
requires commercial speech disclosures in order to prevent deception of
consumers.306 As will be seen, the Zauderer-Milavetz test for required

299

Id.
Id. at 250; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (stating that “disclosure requirements trench
much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interest than do flat prohibitions on speech….”).
301
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250. Although Milavetz argued that
the firm’s advertisements had not been proven actually misleading, the Court stressed
that Zauderer made such an argument unavailing and largely irrelevant. Zauderer,
Justice Sotomayor explained, permits the government to adopt disclosure
requirements in the commercial speech context in order to head off potential
deception of consumers. Id. at 250–51.
302
Id. at 251.
303
Id. at 253 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
304
See supra note 296. Justice Kagan is the only current Justice who was not on the
Court when it decided Milavetz. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
supra note 289.
305
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249.
306
Id. at 249, 253; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
300
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commercial speech disclosures will play an important role in resolving the
tobacco advertising and promotion issues addressed in this Article.307
With the foundational aspects of commercial speech doctrine having
been explored, the remainder of the Article will explore the First Amendment issues associated with current and possible future government efforts
to regulate tobacco advertising and promotion. The immediately following
section considers the two Court of Appeals decisions that have addressed
the constitutionality of such provisions in the 2009 TCA and in related
FDA regulations.
III. FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS REGARDING THE TCA AND FDA
REGULATIONS
As this section will reveal, the government generally fared well in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, the first of the two
appellate decisions resolving First Amendment-based challenges to TCA
provisions and related FDA regulations.308 The second decision, R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, marked a significant defeat for the government, however.309 Although the two decisions do not constitute a circuit
split because they addressed different issues, they reflect little similarity in
philosophical underpinnings and First Amendment mindsets.310 Discussion
of the cases will proceed in the order in which they were decided.
A. The Discount Tobacco Decision
Tobacco companies and other tobacco sellers brought Discount Tobacco as a challenge of almost all of the TCA’s advertising and promotion
provisions.311 After the district court granted summary judgment to the
307

See infra text accompanying notes 345–57, 425–29, 456–61, 465–69.
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United
States, 133 S.Ct. 1996 (2013).
309
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
310
See infra text accompanying notes 324–64, 377–405.
311
See 674 F.3d at 520, 552–54. The list of challenged provisions included the TCA’s
requirement that a to-be-devised graphics element be included as part of the health
warning on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements. See id. The actual graphic
images devised by the FDA were not at issue before the Sixth Circuit because those
images were not developed until after the district court had ruled. Id. at 552–54. The D.C.
Circuit’s later decision in R.J. Reynolds, on the other hand, focused on the
constitutionality of the particular graphic images. See R. J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208,
1222. The TCA’s only marketing-related restrictions not challenged in Discount Tobacco
appear to have been the distribution restrictions that generally barred retailers from using
self-service displays of tobacco products and called for such products to be available only
308
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government on various issues and summary judgment to the plaintiffs on
certain questions, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision largely upholding the
district court’s rulings.312 At the outset of its analysis, the appellate court
stressed the federal government’s extensive efforts to address the public
health problems posed by minors’ use of tobacco products, summarized
the supporting studies relied on by the government, and observed that
there could be “no doubt” about the government’s “significant interest in
preventing juvenile smoking and in warning the general public about the
harms associated with the use of tobacco products.”313 The court cautioned,
however, that manufacturers and other sellers of such products have a protected interest in furnishing truthful information to would-be purchasers and
that adults have a corresponding interest in receiving such information.314
The Discount Tobacco court devoted considerable attention to the First
Amendment principles that would govern the case and consistently rejected the plaintiffs’ various arguments that strict scrutiny should be applied
to some or all of the challenged TCA provisions.315 The court instead
concluded that the commercial speech thrust of those provisions ruled out
the full First Amendment protection the plaintiffs sought.316 For the
TCA’s restrictions on advertising and promotion, the previously discussed
Central Hudson test and the intermediate scrutiny it contemplates would
control the analysis.317 For the statute’s provisions amounting to disclosure

with the aid of retail store personnel. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18. Two
possible reasons come to mind for the Discount Tobacco plaintiffs’ decision not to
challenge those restrictions: first, they are primarily conduct restrictions that affect
speech only incidentally; and second, the Supreme Court held in 2001 that very similar
distribution restrictions imposed by Massachusetts did not transgress the First
Amendment. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567–70 (2001).
312
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 517–18. The Sixth Circuit resolved most issues
unanimously, but by a two-to-one vote on a key question. Judge Clay authored the
majority opinion’s sections to which all three judges subscribed. Judge Stranch wrote the
majority opinion’s section upholding the TCA’s mandate that a graphics element be
included as part of the required health warning, with Judge Clay dissenting from that
ruling. See id. at 517.
313
Id. at 519. The court also cited the Supreme Court’s previous observation that the
government’s interest in curtailing minors’ use of tobacco products is “‘substantial, and even
compelling.’” Id. (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001)).
314
Id. at 520.
315
Id. at 522–26.
316
See id. at 522, 525–26, 532–33, 549–50.
317
Id. at 522–23, 534–37, 541–43.
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requirements, the previously discussed Zauderer test and its less-thanintermediate scrutiny would furnish the guiding principles.318
1. Various TCA Provisions Upheld
The Article’s earlier summary noted that the statute restricted the
marketing of modified-risk tobacco products by requiring pre-market
approval for a tobacco product if its labeling or advertising represented
that it was less harmful than other tobacco products or if the labeling or
advertising employed descriptive terms such as “light” or “mild.”319
Disagreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument that this requirement amounted
to a prior restraint triggering strict scrutiny because it would sweep in
not only commercial speech but also noncommercial speech on public
health matters, the Discount Tobacco court noted Supreme Court precedent indicating that commercial expression is not rendered otherwise by
the mere inclusion of comments on noncommercial issues.320 The court
reasoned that the modified-risk product provisions’ references to labeling
and advertising contemplated restrictions on commercial speech only and
did not impair tobacco companies’ ability to comment in noncommercial
contexts on public health issues.321
Turning to the controlling Central Hudson test, the Sixth Circuit noted
the government’s substantial underlying interest in preventing consumers
from being deceived by misleading claims about tobacco product safety.322
To support its conclusion that the modified-risk product requirements would
directly advance the prevention-of-deception interest in a narrowly tailored
manner, the court cited evidence of tobacco companies’ history of making
misleading health-related claims about their products.323 Although tobacco
companies would have preferred that the government opt for “post-market
review of deceptive claims” instead of the pre-market regime established by
the modified-risk product rules, the court concluded that “the government
318

Id. at 523–24, 527, 554–69. The Supreme Court has described Zauderer’s test for
required commercial speech disclosures as “less exacting scrutiny” than the intermediate
scrutiny contemplated by the Central Hudson test. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010).
319
See supra text accompanying notes 128–31.
320
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 532–33 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 67–68 (1983), for the proposition that statements linking a product to a matter of
public debate do not turn speech that is otherwise commercial into fully protected
noncommercial expression).
321
Id. at 532–33, 537.
322
Id. at 534–35.
323
Id. at 535–37.
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has made a reasonable determination that, in the context of a deadly and
highly addictive product, it would be a virtual impossibility to unring the
bell of misinformation after it has been rung.”324 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, unanimously upheld the modified-risk product provisions.325
As noted earlier, the TCA also barred tobacco product manufacturers
and sellers from making representations, in labeling, advertising, or through
the media, that would mislead consumers into believing that the products
being sold had FDA approval, that the FDA had deemed the products safe,
or that the products were less harmful to users’ health by virtue of FDA
regulation.326 The plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny because the provision’s reference to representations through “the media” could apply to noncommercial speech by persons outside the tobacco industry.327 The Sixth
Circuit disagreed, instead construing the statute as reaching only commercial speech by that industry.328 Employing reasoning similar to its reasoning
in upholding the modified-risk product rules, the court unanimously sustained this TCA provision as an appropriately tailored way of furthering
the government’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.329
The Discount Tobacco plaintiffs also failed in their challenges to the
TCA’s previously discussed restrictions on tobacco companies’ distribution
of free samples of their products, on their use of tobacco product names,
logos, or symbols on non-tobacco merchandise, and on their use of tobacco
product names in event sponsorship.330 The Sixth Circuit noted that those
restrictions dealt with forms of advertising and either restricted speech directly or targeted an activity’s communicative impact.331 But they were
constitutionally permissible restrictions on commercial speech because they
would directly advance the government’s interests in curtailing minors’ use
of tobacco products and lessening inducements to engage in that unhealthy
practice, and would do so in narrowly tailored ways.332
324

Id. at 537.
Id.
326
See supra text accompanying notes 124–27.
327
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 533.
328
Id. at 549–50.
329
Id. at 551. In so holding, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, which had
erroneously applied strict scrutiny to the measure in question. Id.
330
Id. at 539–43. For earlier discussion of these restrictions, see supra text
accompanying notes 116–22.
331
See 674 F.3d at 538–39.
332
See id. at 539–43 (holding that banning the distribution of free samples except at
adults-only facilities was a logical way of keeping tobacco products out of the hands of
minors). The prohibition on use of tobacco product names, logos, and symbols on nontobacco items was appropriate as well, given the high percentages of adolescent smokers
325
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In its conclusions regarding the above restrictions, the court refused to
accept tobacco companies’ argument that there is little meaningful relationship between advertising and consumer behavior.333 Such an argument
“stretches the bounds of credulity,” the court scoffed, especially when one
considers the billions of dollars spent on tobacco advertising each year.334
Emphasizing tobacco companies’ continued need to recruit new users of
their products, the court indicated that the relationship between advertising
and consumer behavior should be taken especially seriously when minors
are exposed to tobacco advertising.335
2. Color Graphics Mandate and Other Required Warning
Provisions Upheld
As discussed earlier, the TCA required that color graphics be included
as a significant element of the rotating warnings mandated for use on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements.336 The statute also specified
size and appearance requirements for display of the warnings.337 In sustaining the graphic images requirement and the related prominence-ofdisplay commands, the Discount Tobacco court devoted greater attention
to those provisions than to any of the other challenged TCA provisions.338
who possess tobacco-branded merchandise and the reasonableness of the assumption that
ongoing exposure to such brand-awareness efforts could make tobacco product use
attractive to minors. See id. at 541–42. As for the ban on using tobacco product names in
sponsoring events, the measure was a suitably crafted way of curtailing a very visible (to
minors) brand-awareness device on which tobacco companies had spent huge sums of
money. Id. at 542–43. Tobacco companies interested in sponsoring events could still use
their corporate names in doing so, as long as those names were not the same as a tobacco
brand. Id. at 543.
333
Id. at 539–41.
334
Id. at 539–40. The court noted that in the 2001 Lorillard decision, the Supreme
Court recognized the soundness of a conclusion that advertising stimulates demand. Id. at
541; see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 557–61 (2001). The Sixth Circuit
also refused to accept the tobacco companies’ argument that the vast sums they spend on
advertising are meant solely “to attract and retain adult consumers.” Disc. Tobacco, 674
F.3d at 540. According to the court, “it is impossible to believe that promotion so
successful in the adult context that it is valued by Plaintiffs at $13 billion dollars [the
amount spent on tobacco advertising during a recent year] had absolutely no effect on
anyone below the age of eighteen.” Id.
335
See id. at 540–41.
336
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
§ 201(d), 123 Stat. 1776, 1843 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)
(2012)); see also supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
337
See supra text accompanying notes 92–101.
338
See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554–69.
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The court stressed that it was deciding only whether the TCA violated the
First Amendment by requiring that the health warnings include a color
graphics element to be devised by the FDA.339 The court was not ruling on
the constitutionality of the particular graphic images devised by the FDA
in response to the TCA’s instruction.340
All three judges on the Discount Tobacco panel agreed that strict scrutiny should not govern their analysis of the warning requirement and the
textual and graphic content called for by the TCA, despite the plaintiffs’
argument they supposedly were being made mouthpieces for the government’s views in a subjective and controversial government-dictated marketing campaign against their products.341 The court observed that the
textual portions of the rotating warnings dealt with matters that experts
widely accepted as fact regarding health risks of tobacco use and were, in
any event, merely versions of warnings long required by federal law.342
Moreover, the fact that the warnings must appear on product packages and
in advertisements made the requirement a commercial speech matter (a
conclusion not altered by the TCA’s directive that a color graphics element
accompany the textual warnings).343 The court’s unanimity disappeared,
however, when discussion turned to which set of commercial speech principles—those coming from Central Hudson regarding restrictions or those
coming from Zauderer regarding required disclosures—should control the
case.344 Judge Stranch wrote for a two-judge majority in holding that Zauderer not only controlled but also furnished a basis for sustaining the color
graphics requirement.345

339

Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 520, 552–54. The Sixth Circuit stressed that the plaintiffs had brought “only
a facial challenge” in which they “argue that the [TCA’s] graphic-warnings requirement
is itself unconstitutional, not that the specific images the FDA chose to implement the
requirement are unconstitutional.” Id. at 552. Because the actual images the FDA devised
did not come into being until after the district court had ruled, the particular images were
not part of the appeal. Id. at 552–54.
341
Id. at 523–27. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the public
already knows the health risks of tobacco product use and that the TCA’s requirements
made the mandatory warnings overly intrusive. Citing the government’s showing that
minors do not fully understand these risks and have a tendency to underestimate some of
them, the court noted that the warning requirement was designed to lead to better
understanding of the health risks. Id. at 524–25.
342
Id. at 525–26.
343
See id. at 526–27.
344
Id. at 551–52.
345
Id. at 551–69; see also id. at 527–30 (Clay, J., dissenting in part) (authoring most
of the majority opinion and otherwise joining in it, but dissenting on the ground that the
340
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Judge Stranch’s portion of the Discount Tobacco majority opinion stated that the TCA’s warning requirement was a disclosure requirement in its
textual and graphic elements.346 Although the textual elements could more
readily be classified as required disclosures of factual matters, the graphic
elements merited the same classification because the TCA contemplated
that the graphic elements would complement and help explain the factual
information in the textual elements.347 This meant that Zauderer’s treatment
of required disclosures furnished the governing framework.348
Under the test devised in Zauderer and recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, disclosures required by the government in the commercial
speech context are permissible under the First Amendment if they are
reasonably related to the prevention of consumer deception.349 The Discount Tobacco majority concluded that the TCA-mandated warning (including its textual and graphics components) was meant to guard against the
prospect that consumers could suffer from misconceptions regarding the
nature and extent of the health risks associated with tobacco product use.350
As such, the warning requirement served to prevent consumer deception or
similar erroneous understandings regarding important health concerns.351
Having determined that the TCA’s warning requirement was a disclosure requirement and that it was meant to prevent consumer deception or
similar misimpressions regarding health risks, the court still needed to
decide whether the requirement was reasonably related to the deceptionprevention (or similar) purpose.352 The court said it was related because
the textual components of the rotating warnings called for statements of
fact about health risks and because the graphic elements, besides offering
Central Hudson test should have been applied and would have resulted in invalidation of
the color graphics requirement).
346
Id. at 551, 558.
347
See id. at 558–59.
348
See id. at 551, 558.
349
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–50
(2010); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
350
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–63.
351
See id. at 558–63; see also id. at 556–58 (discussing a Second Circuit Court
decision where the court used the Zauderer test when analyzing a similar warning). The
court noted the record’s considerable evidence indicating that the public does not fully
and accurately understand the particular health risks posed by tobacco use even if there is
widespread awareness that use of such products is not a healthful practice. Id. at 562–63.
Moreover, the court noted that the Zauderer approach applies regardless of whether the
disclosure requirement addresses actual deception or potential deception. Id. at 558.
352
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. The Discount Tobacco court characterized the
Zauderer test as contemplating “rational-basis” review. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561–62.
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factual information, would augment the communication process by attracting
attention to the warnings and making them more understandable.353 The
majority noted evidence of tobacco companies’ past behaviors involving
misleading consumers or conspiring to cover up negative health-related
information, and observed that despite the longstanding presence of
warnings on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements, the public still did not fully understand the health risks.354 Therefore, it was
reasonable for the government to sharpen the warnings and require use
of graphic images to make the warnings less likely to be ignored and the
messages communicated by them more likely to resonate with consumers.355 The court also noted that other countries have required prominently displayed graphic elements in health warnings regarding tobacco
products and presumably have thereby achieved greater effectiveness in
communicating health risks.356 This further evidence suggested that Congress had acted reasonably in enacting the TCA provisions at issue.357
353

See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–64. Citing language from another part of
Zauderer regarding the importance of the ability to use graphic elements in advertising as
a communication aid, see Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647, the court stressed that graphic
elements can be just as accurate as textual elements. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559–60.
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647–49. These observations enabled the court to dispose of the
plaintiffs’ argument that in imposing the requirement of including graphic images,
Congress was requiring tobacco companies to communicate opinions rather than facts.
See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558–61. In an interesting aside that probably was
unnecessary for resolution of the case but holds relevance for the issues addressed later in
the Article, the court listed hypothetical examples of graphic images that would be factual
in nature and therefore “would be scrutinized [under Zauderer] for a rational basis.” Id. at
559. It noted that “a graphic could consist of one of the required textual warnings—
‘WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children.’—written in what appears to be a
child’s handwriting.” Id. The court went on to cite additional examples of graphic images
amounting to factual disclosures:
[A] picture or drawing of a nonsmoker’s and smoker’s lungs displayed side by side; a picture of a doctor looking at an x-ray of either
a smoker’s cancerous lungs or some other part of the body presenting
a smoking-related condition; a picture or drawing of the internal
anatomy of a person suffering from a smoking-related medical condition; [and] a picture or drawing of a person suffering from a smokingrelated medical condition.
Id.
354
See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 562–64.
355
Id. at 561–64.
356
Id. at 565–66.
357
Id. at 565–67; see id. at 531, 569. In a partial dissent in which he argued for
application of the Central Hudson test rather than the Zauderer test, Judge Clay
contended that the TCA’s requirement of a graphics element was unprecedented and not
narrowly tailored to furtherance of the government’s interests. Id. at 527–30 (Clay, J.,
dissenting in part). Judge Stranch’s majority opinion on the graphics requirement asserted
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The Sixth Circuit devoted more brief attention to the TCA’s detailed
manner-of-display requirements for the rotating warnings.358 It concluded
that in requiring the warnings to occupy the top half of the front and back
of cigarette packages, approximately one-third of the front and back of
smokeless tobacco packages, and twenty percent of an advertisement’s
space, Congress acted permissibly.359 The court believed that the mannerof-display requirements were “reasonably tailored to overcoming the informational deficit regarding tobacco harms” and that the government had
demonstrated that “larger warnings materially affect consumers’ awareness of the health consequences of smoking and decisions regarding
tobacco use.”360
In addition, the court rejected as “unpersuasive” the tobacco companies’
argument that the manner-of-display requirements were “unduly burdensome because the scale of the warning label drowns out their speech….”361
The Sixth Circuit did not give credence to the plaintiffs’ argument that such
prominently displayed labels “might dissuade certain smokers from buying
their product by making it appear unhealthy or otherwise unattractive.”362
Such an effect was not constitutionally problematic, the court seemed to
suggest.363 It saw nothing wrong with the government’s requiring truthful, if
unpleasant, information in labels and advertisements as part of an effort to
curtail minors’ use of tobacco products.364
3. TCA Provisions Struck Down
Although Discount Tobacco resulted in various wins for the government, the tobacco companies did prevail on certain issues.365 They
achieved a minor victory in the court’s striking down of a TCA provision
that in conducting his assessment of the graphics requirement, Judge Clay was not only
relying on the wrong test but was allowing himself to be influenced by the particular
graphic images chosen by the FDA—images whose constitutionality was not an issue
before the court. Id. at 567–69 (majority opinion).
358
See id. at 524–31.
359
Id. at 524, 530–31.
360
Id. at 530.
361
Id. The tobacco companies had made no showing, the court observed, that the
remaining portions of their packages and advertisements constituted insufficient room
for the display of their product names, logos, and other information. Id. at 530–31; see
id. at 567.
362
Id. at 531.
363
See id.
364
See id; see also id. at 569 (observing that even if a graphic image were to depict
something unpleasant and therefore cause a “visceral” reaction on the part of those who see
it, the image could still be a factual disclosure and therefore permissible under Zauderer).
365
See id. at 537–39, 541–44.
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that barred the furnishing of non-tobacco items in return for purchases of
tobacco products.366 This provision would have restricted tobacco companies’ ability to continue so-called continuity programs involving adult
purchasers of their products: programs in which regular purchasers would
receive other merchandise as a reward for being good customers.367 The
court invalidated the restriction because, insofar as such programs are
geared toward adult purchasers, the TCA provision did not bear a sufficient
relationship to the statute’s protection-of-minors purposes.368
The Discount Tobacco plaintiffs achieved a bigger victory concerning
the TCA’s previously discussed provision that restricted tobacco advertisers’ use of color imagery. This provision permitted use of only a black-andwhite format (black text on a white background, or vice-versa) in most
forms of tobacco advertising.369 The court rejected the government’s argument that uses of color in tobacco advertisements are inherently misleading
and thus properly subject to a prophylactic ban.370 Instead, the government
would have to follow a tougher route: proceeding after the fact against
advertisers whose particular uses of color could be proven deceptive.371
Moreover, the court believed that the ban on color imagery swept far
too broadly in restricting speech.372 The court again invoked Zauderer, but
this time to point out that decision’s discussion of commercial speech
restrictions and the Supreme Court’s comments on the value to advertisers
of being able to use color in order to attract interest and aid communication.373 The Sixth Circuit therefore struck down the restriction on uses of
color imagery.374

366

See id. at 537–38, 544.
Id. at 537–38.
368
See id. at 543–44. The invalidated restriction thus was different from the TCA’s
previously discussed no-free-samples provision, which the court upheld because of its
direct connection to the interest in removing inducements for minors to use tobacco
products. Id. at 541; see Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S.
229, 249–53 (2010).
369
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
370
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 547–48.
371
See id. at 546–48.
372
Id.
373
See id. at 547; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985). Zauderer thus played dual roles in Discount
Tobacco: furnishing the controlling framework for assessing the TCA’s disclosure
requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 345–57, and shedding light on how to
evaluate sweeping commercial speech restrictions. See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 547.
374
Id. at 548.
367
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B. The R.J. Reynolds Decision
Whereas Discount Tobacco involved an attack on various TCA provisions, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA375 focused much more narrowly
on a government action related to the TCA but different from any restriction or requirement addressed in the earlier case. In R.J. Reynolds,
tobacco companies challenged the particular graphic images devised by
the FDA in response to the TCA’s directive to develop graphic images for
inclusion in the required warning on cigarette packages and in cigarette
advertisements.376 The D.C. Circuit held that the FDA-devised graphic
images violated the First Amendment.377
Writing for a two-judge majority, Judge Brown sent early signals about
the ultimate outcome of the case. In background information, the court
stated that in a proposed regulation soliciting comment on thirty-six graphic
images under consideration, the agency advocated “a dramatic expansion of
the existing health warnings” and cited a supposed international consensus
that health warnings featuring graphics were more effective than text-only
warnings.378 The court quickly reminded readers, however, that even though
more than thirty nations required pictorial elements in health warnings for
tobacco products and other nations were considering such requirements,
“the constitutions of these countries do not necessarily protect individual
liberties as stringently as does the United States Constitution.”379
The D.C. Circuit noted that that the FDA selected the nine graphic images described earlier after reviewing the results of a commissioned study of
18,000 consumers and after reviewing and responding to more than a thousand comments.380 The court then singled out comments to which, it suggested, the FDA had not paid sufficient heed.381 These comments, as summarized
by the court, faulted the FDA’s study for not producing adequate evidence
that the use of warnings with graphic elements would reduce smoking
rates.382 The reduction of smoking rates notion played a recurring role in the
375

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1211. For descriptions of the images, see supra text accompanying notes
105–09. Recall that in Discount Tobacco, the court upheld the TCA’s requirement that a
to-be-devised graphic element form part of the required rotating warnings, but that the
actual images the FDA devised were not before the court. See Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at
551–52.
377
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221–22.
378
Id. at 1209.
379
Id. at 1209 n.3.
380
Id. at 1209.
381
See id. at 1209–11.
382
See id. at 1210.
376
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majority opinion, as the court consistently came back to that notion as being
the overriding, or perhaps only, purpose underlying the FDA regulation approving the particular images.383
Before identifying the appropriate First Amendment test to govern the
case, the R.J. Reynolds court observed that “[t]he only question before us
is whether FDA’s promulgation of the graphic warning labels—which
incorporate the textual warnings, a corresponding graphic image, and the
‘1–800–QUIT–NOW’ cessation hotline number—violates the First
Amendment.”384 The court flirted with the possibility of analyzing the
case under strict scrutiny and the full First Amendment protection it contemplates.385 In that flirtation, the majority cited the Supreme Court’s
compelled speech decisions regarding noncommercial settings,386 and
went on to observe that “[t]his case contains elements of compulsion and
forced subsidization” of the government’s “ideological and not informational” message.387 Although it acknowledged that the government may
mandate warnings to consumers about dangerous products, the court contended that “this case raises novel questions about the scope of government’s authority to force the manufacturer of a product to go beyond making purely factual and accurate commercial disclosures and undermine its
own economic interest” by making it communicate “the government’s
anti-smoking message.”388
Just as it appeared poised to hold that strict scrutiny would govern the
analysis, the D.C. Circuit court stepped back and noted that because the
FDA’s graphic images pertained to tobacco companies’ marketing of their

383

See id. at 1216–21. In his dissent, Judge Rogers faulted the majority for ignoring
another key purpose underlying the TCA and the FDA regulations that stemmed from it.
See infra text accompanying notes 406–14.
384
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211. In addition, the court stated that the tobacco
companies “do not dispute Congress’s authority to require health warnings on cigarette
packages, nor do they challenge the substance of any of the nine textual statements
mandated by the [TCA].” Id. When the court’s careful phrasing in identifying the issues and
non-issues is considered alongside its later reasoning in invalidating the actual graphic
images, one wonders whether the court might have struck down the TCA’s general
requirement that graphic images be included in the health warnings if that requirement had
been raised as an issue in the case.
385
See id. at 1211–13. In granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the district
court had applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 1212–13, 1217.
386
Id. at 1211. Wooley v. Maynard was among the cases the court cited. Id.; see
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
387
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211.
388
Id. at 1212. The court also observed that “[i]n effect, the graphic images are not
warnings, but admonitions: ‘[D]on’t buy or use this product.’” Id. at 1211.
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products, commercial speech principles apparently should control.389 But
as the Sixth Circuit had to do in Discount Tobacco when it ruled on the
TCA’s requirement that to-be-devised graphic images form part of the
required warnings, the R.J. Reynolds court needed to decide which set of
commercial speech principles would apply. Would it be Zauderer’s test
for required disclosures, or Central Hudson’s test for restrictions?390
The R.J. Reynolds court concluded that the Zauderer framework did not
apply.391 Zauderer, the court noted, called for review “akin to rational-basis
review”392 if the commercial speech disclosures the government required
were of factual, noncontroversial information and were reasonably related
to prevention of consumer deception.393 The court expressed doubt about
whether the graphic images provided factual information, as opposed to
communicating opinions or being mere devices for evoking emotional responses.394 Moreover, returning to the notion that the FDA’s graphic images
were designed only to produce a reduction in smoking rates, the court concluded that because prevention of consumer deception supposedly was not
an underlying purpose, the graphic images could not be treated as disclosures subject to review under Zauderer.395 Accordingly, the court reasoned,
389

See id. at 1213, 1217. The court noted that in so concluding, it was following the
lead of one of its own decisions in which commercial speech principles had been applied
to required corrective disclosures. Id. at 1217; see United States v. Philip Morris USA
Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–45 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (the government’s civil RICO case against
tobacco companies).
390
See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213, 1217. For discussion of this choice in Discount
Tobacco, see supra text accompanying notes 345–57. Either way, the D.C. Circuit
maintained in R.J. Reynolds, “a thorny question remains: how much leeway should ... the
government [receive] when it seeks to compel a product’s manufacturer to convey the
state’s subjective—and perhaps even ideological—view that consumers should reject this
otherwise legal, but disfavored, product?” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212.
391
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17. The D.C. Circuit thus resolved the Zauderer-orCentral Hudson question the opposite way the Discount Tobacco majority resolved it in its
ruling on the TCA’s graphic images provision. See supra text accompanying notes 345–57.
392
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212.
393
Id.; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
394
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17.
395
See id. at 1216–17. The court strained to reason that the graphic images could not
be seen as designed to prevent consumers from having misimpressions about health risks
because the TCA’s sections other than the warning-requirement section (such as the
provision restricting the use of terms such as “light” or “mild”) were designed to deal
with, and apparently took care of, the problem of consumers being deceived or mislead
about health risks. See id. at 1214–15. Nor was the majority swayed by the argument that
the graphic images should be evaluated against the backdrop of tobacco companies’
history of misrepresentations of health risks. The court observed that the regulation
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the usual commercial speech rules—those provided by Central Hudson—
would have to control the analysis.396
Applying the Central Hudson test, the D.C. Circuit began by “assuming” that reducing smoking rates was a substantial government interest.397
The court then criticized studies relied on by the FDA as presenting “questionable social science”398 and stressed that the government’s evidence
concerning other nations’ required pictorial health warnings did not
demonstrate a direct link between those warnings and a smoking-rate
reduction attributable to such a requirement.399 Therefore, the court concluded, the government had not shown that the graphic images chosen by
the FDA would result in a reduction of smoking rates.400 This meant that
the government had failed Central Hudson’s direct-advancement element
and that the graphic images therefore violated the First Amendment.401
The R.J. Reynolds majority’s application of the Central Hudson test
again featured the court’s insistence that reduction of smoking rates was
the sole objective underlying the FDA-devised graphic images.402 Perhaps
only to respond to a key point in Judge Rogers’s dissent that effectively
communicating health risks in order to correct misimpressions was also a
government objective underlying the graphic images,403 the majority
acknowledged that the FDA had asserted such an objective during the
litigation.404 However, the court maintained, effective communication of
health risks was “not an independent interest capable of sustaining” the
FDA’s graphic images; rather, it was “merely a description of the means
by which [the FDA] plans to accomplish its goal of reducing smoking
rates.”405
Judge Rogers vigorously dissented. He maintained that with the exception of the “1–800–QUIT–NOW” element, the images devised by the FDA
would pass First Amendment muster under either Zauderer or Central

setting forth the graphic images did not specify that the images were meant to combat
specific deceptive claims by the tobacco industry. See id. at 1215–16.
396
See id. at 1217.
397
Id. at 1218.
398
Id. at 1219.
399
See id.
400
See id. at 1219–20.
401
See id. at 1219–21.
402
See id. at 1218.
403
Id. at 1235–36 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
404
See id. at 1221 (majority opinion).
405
Id.
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Hudson.406 Judge Rogers chided the majority for its refusal to treat effective
communication of health risks as a government interest underlying the
graphic images.407 That interest, he asserted, was consistent with a goal
of preventing consumers from holding misimpressions regarding health
risks and thus made the graphic images prevention-of-deception requirements for purposes of Zauderer.408 In addition, Judge Rogers criticized the majority for evaluating the graphic images as if they stood on
their own rather than as they would actually appear: in conjunction with
the textual elements of the required warnings.409 Viewed in conjunction
with the textual elements, the graphic images communicated factual
information or at least aided in communicating the factual information in
the textual elements, a further reason for saying that the images should
be sustained under the Zauderer test.410
Even if Zauderer did not apply and Central Hudson furnished the controlling framework, Judge Rogers continued, the graphic images should be
sustained.411 Again chastising the majority for not treating effective communication of health risks as a government interest to be considered, he
stressed that such an interest is substantial in nature and that the graphic
images would directly advance the interest in a narrowly tailored way.412
Concerning the direct-advancement element, the FDA should be able to
pass that hurdle on the basis of common sense, the studies the agency
relied on, and other nations’ perceptions of whether the pictorial images in
their required health warnings more effectively communicated health risks
than text-only warnings.413 Regarding both the direct-advancement element and the narrow tailoring element, indications that longstanding textual warnings had not eliminated misimpressions about health risks should
justify taking a new approach involving the graphic images.414
The following section considers the implications of existing interpretations of the First Amendment for the current TCA provisions and for possible
406

Id. at 1222–23 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Judge Rogers concluded that regardless of
whether Zauderer or Central Hudson controlled, the inclusion of the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” statement in the graphic images could not be justified. Id. at 1223, 1236.
407
Id.
408
Id. at 1223, 1225, 1227–34. Judge Rogers also asserted that tobacco companies’
past history of deception and covering-up of health risks should be kept in mind when
evaluating the warning requirements. See id. at 1224, 1228–29.
409
Id.
410
Id. at 1230–34.
411
Id.
412
Id. at 1234–35.
413
Id. at 1235–36.
414
Id.
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future statutory and administrative measures regulating tobacco advertising
and promotion. It assesses the reasoning employed in the Discount Tobacco
and R.J. Reynolds decisions discussed above, explores what Congress and the
FDA should and should not be able to do in requiring and devising new
graphic images for use in the required health warnings, and considers how the
Supreme Court should rule if a Discount Tobacco or R.J. Reynolds-type case
were to come before it.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT LINE-DRAWING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT
AND FUTURE REGULATORY EFFORTS
How did the Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds courts do in regard to
soundness of reasoning? Answering that question begins the process of
determining what actions Congress and the FDA can and should be able to
take in terms of regulating tobacco advertising and promotion without violating the First Amendment. As the following analysis will indicate, “generally quite well” should be the answer regarding the Discount Tobacco court,
with the R.J. Reynolds court meriting an “on the whole, poorly” response.
A. Assessing Discount Tobacco
The range and different natures of the TCA provisions challenged in
Discount Tobacco made the Sixth Circuit’s task a difficult one. Add the
different lines of potentially applicable reasoning stemming from the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions,415 and a court in the Sixth
Circuit’s position has an even more difficult assignment. Throw in the
not-always-clear suggestions from the Supreme Court that the relevant
First Amendment rules and tests may need changing or may already be
undergoing subtle shading,416 and a task of the sort faced by the Discount
Tobacco court becomes tougher yet.
Considering the just-noted factors, the Sixth Circuit produced a solid,
well-reasoned, and well-supported decision in Discount Tobacco. In upholding most of the TCA provisions that amounted to restrictions on tobacco advertising and marketing, the court properly rejected the tobacco
companies’ arguments that strict scrutiny should be applied to at least
some of the restrictions.417 If courts were to give credence to tobacco
415

See supra text accompanying notes 164–232, 263–307.
See supra text accompanying notes 199–263.
417
See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 522,
525–26, 532–33, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). For a less favorable assessment of Discount Tobacco than
416
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companies’ argument that restrictions on what they may say in labeling
and advertising should be subjected to strict scrutiny because comments
on health issues outside the labeling and context would trigger very substantial First Amendment protection, the distinction between commercial
speech and noncommercial speech would be all-but obliterated, and the
government’s ability to regulate in the interest of promoting public health
would be severely impaired. There would also be a paradoxical and indefensible effect: the greater the health risks or dangers associated with a
widely used product (and hence the greater the chance that major health
concerns would be present), the lesser the ability of government to restrict
reasonable amounts of speech in an effort to safeguard public health.
Moreover, accepting tobacco companies’ strict scrutiny argument
would run contrary to a longstanding line of Supreme Court decisions to
which the Court still adheres despite hints about possible changes in the
rules.418 A federal court of appeals obviously cannot give Supreme Court
hints primacy over actual Supreme Court holdings, especially when the
Supreme Court itself has not permitted the hints to translate into new rules
despite little check on its doing so except for an easy-to-get-around tradition of adherence to precedent.419 In Discount Tobacco, the Sixth Circuit
commendably stuck with the Central Hudson test for commercial speech
restrictions and applied it both realistically and with appropriate rigor, not
to mention evenhandedly.
The Discount Tobacco court should also be commended for how it
dealt with the Supreme Court’s 2011 Sorrell decision, which is to say that
the Sixth Circuit for the most part did not attempt to deal with the puzzling
Supreme Court decision. Recall that in Sorrell, the Supreme Court spent
considerable time discussing a supposed need for “heightened scrutiny” of
certain commercial speech restrictions. Which ones? Evidently those that
bar a commercial speaker from disclosing or using certain information for
marketing purposes when other speakers are permitted to use the very
same information for non-marketing purposes, though the Court was less
than clear about whether heightened scrutiny should be applied only then
or perhaps more broadly.420 In Sorrell, the Court worried that pharmaceutical companies had been singled out for adverse treatment regarding their
the one offered here, see Danielle Weatherby & Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The
Tobacco Control Act’s Anti-Smoking Regulations Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76
ALB. L. REV. 121, 140–43 (2012/2013).
418
See supra notes 174, 182; supra text accompanying notes 245–51.
419
Even if the Supreme Court’s overruling of an earlier precedent is the exception
rather than the rule, the exception has occurred with reasonable frequency over the years.
420
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660-67 (2011).
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marketing efforts.421 But in the end the Court backed away from the
heightened scrutiny rationale it floated, and officially relied on Central
Hudson for the controlling framework.422 Other courts would do well to
follow the Sixth Circuit’s Discount Tobacco example by applying Sorrell
only for what it actually did in deciding the case under Central Hudson, by
noting Sorrell’s mention of the need to be suspicious of governmental
attempts to keep the public in the dark through speech restrictions,423 and
by then letting the sleeping Sorrell dog lie, pending clarification from the
Supreme Court on what (if anything) to make of the heightened scrutiny
analysis in commercial speech cases.
The Discount Tobacco court also provided a model for other courts,
including the Supreme Court, to follow in distinguishing between commercial speech restrictions and required commercial speech disclosures
and in properly applying the relevant Supreme Court precedents. The
Sixth Circuit’s appropriate applications of the Central Hudson test for
evaluating commercial speech restrictions have already been noted. The
court likewise insightfully applied Zauderer’s test for required commercial
speech disclosures to the TCA’s requirement that graphic images be part
of the required health warning on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements.424 As held in Zauderer and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in the 2010 Milavetz decision, required disclosures of factual information
in commercial speech settings do not violate the First Amendment if they
are reasonably related to prevention of consumer deception.425
In sustaining the TCA’s graphic images requirement, the Discount Tobacco court sensibly concluded that graphic images can be just as accurate
as textual statements of fact and that, to the extent they accompany the
indisputably accurate statements in the textual portions of the warning, the
graphic images should be treated as conveying factual information.426
Then, appropriately taking into account a key TCA purpose of more effectively communicating health risks of tobacco product use and thereby
lessening the chances that consumers would suffer from misimpressions,
the court concluded that the graphic image requirement was effectively a
421

Id. at 2663. The horror! Don’t commercial speech restrictions commonly do this?
Id. at 2667.
423
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 546 (6th Cir.
2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1996 (2013); see
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
424
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
425
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229,
249–50 (2010).
426
Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558–59.
422
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prevention-of-deception requirement.427 The court took what appeared to
be a substance-over-form approach that correctly considered the TCA’s
purposes, and in particular, a purpose stated in the federal statute whose
warning requirement the TCA amended, but whose statement of purpose
remained unchanged.428 Finally, the Sixth Circuit was equally on the mark
in concluding that the graphic images requirement was reasonably related
to the previously discussed purpose in light of the evidence indicating that
minors and other members of the public still do not fully understand the
nature and extent of the health risks despite the fact that textual warnings
have been required for many years.429
One quarrel with the Discount Tobacco decision should be noted,
however. It is a fairly small quarrel about a matter of a harmless-error
nature, given how the case came out, but the error would not be so harmless if committed by another court in a future case. The Discount Tobacco
court correctly noted that Zauderer’s applicable test for required commercial speech disclosures furnishes less First Amendment protection than
does the usual treatment of commercial speech.430 Then, however, the
court observed that if a required commercial speech disclosure does not
qualify for Zauderer treatment (if, for instance, it does not deal with factual information or it is not meant to prevent consumer deception), the Supreme Court’s compelled speech precedents control and strict scrutiny is
applied.431 Although the Supreme Court may have offered suggestions in
that regard, it has not clearly held that the compelled speech decisions,
which deal with noncommercial speech, automatically apply to required
commercial speech disclosures that fall outside the Zauderer umbrella.432
The supposed jump all the way to full First Amendment protection when
Zauderer does not apply to a required commercial speech disclosure is
427

Id. at 558–61, 562–64.
See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 25–28, 81–85 (discussing Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act’s stated purpose of using warning requirement to
inform public of health risks of smoking, and noting that purposes section of FCLAA has
remained unchanged even after TCA’s modifications of FCLAA’s warning requirement).
429
See 674 F.3d at 561–64. It is perhaps a bit surprising that the court did not devote
more discussion to the tobacco companies’ objection that the required size of the
warnings amounted to an unreasonable and unduly burdensome requirement, but the
court did note that the plaintiffs had made no showing that they could not get the
marketing messages across in the spaces still available to them. Id. at 530–31. Moreover,
the court no doubt was influenced by the legal reality that the government only had to
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either erroneous or should be erroneous. More logically, a required commercial speech disclosure to which Zauderer does not apply remains in the
commercial speech realm and should be considered under the test constituting the next-higher level of protection: the Central Hudson test.
B. Assessing R.J. Reynolds
The R.J. Reynolds decision includes far less of which to approve. Perhaps the best piece of advice to courts deciding tobacco advertising-related
cases is this: read Judge Rogers’s dissent and pay attention to his analysis.
Lest the previous statement seem too harsh, a positive aspect of Judge
Brown’s majority opinion should be noted: its correct conclusion that if a
required commercial speech disclosure does not qualify for Zauderer
treatment, the Central Hudson test, not strict scrutiny, furnishes the controlling framework.433 Otherwise, however, the R.J. Reynolds decision
reflected flawed reasoning.
With a number of its initial comments summarized earlier, the D.C.
Circuit seemed to prefer the idea of applying strict scrutiny to the FDA
regulation setting forth the graphic images developed in response to the
TCA directive.434 Circuit precedent indicated, however, that commercial
speech principles should control.435 But commercial speech principles
would serve well enough as a basis for invalidating the graphic images,
the court seemed to suggest, if the right set of those principles were applied in a rigorous enough manner.436 The court candidly referred to the
Zauderer test for required commercial speech disclosures as rational-basis
review437 and then proceeded with a strained analysis that seemed calculated to make certain that the more lenient test would be disqualified.
As previous discussion noted, Judge Brown’s majority opinion consistently invoked the notion that reduction of smoking rates was the only government purpose underlying the graphic images.438 This insistence defied
legal and factual reality, for the FDA expressly also relied on a second government interest: more effectively communicating with consumers to lessen
433
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the likelihood that they would continue to experience misimpressions of
the full nature and extent of the health risks associated with smoking.439
Moreover, the R.J. Reynolds court’s refusal to acknowledge this purpose
on the part of the government ignored legal and factual reality in another
sense: the clear statement of such a purpose in findings set forth in the
TCA and in the previously discussed Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA). The TCA’s provisions on required health warnings (including the requirements that the warnings contain both textual and
graphic elements) amended the FCLAA’s longstanding warning requirement but left the FCLAA’s purposes section unchanged.440 That purposes
section spoke—and still speaks—in terms of effectively communicating
health-risk information to consumers.441
Surely a purpose set forth in the TCA findings and in the federal statute
whose warning requirement the TCA amended should be seen as a purpose
relied on by the FDA when it devised the graphic images in response to the
TCA’s directive. But not for the R.J. Reynolds majority, whose strategy
worked. If, as the majority maintained, more clearly communicating health
risks information in order to prevent misimpressions among consumers
was not a purpose underlying the graphic images, the required images
could not qualify as deception-prevention disclosures under Zauderer.442
With Zauderer knocked out as a potential source of guiding principles,
Central Hudson’s higher standard of review would have to control.443
Even though it does not furnish the level of protection strict scrutiny does,
the Central Hudson test would be adequate to invalidate the graphic images if a certain purpose would be identified as the only one and the test’s
final elements were applied rigorously. The R.J. Reynolds majority proceeded accordingly, again taking an artificially narrow view of the government’s underlying purposes and applying the test very strictly against
the government.444 Again the court insisted that reducing smoking rates
was the only purpose underlying the graphic images, but this time, perhaps
439

See 696 F.3d at 1223, 1225 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 25–28, 81–85.
441
Id.
442
See 696 F.3d at 1214–16. For good measure, the court asserted that the images did
not really amount to factual disclosures anyway. Id. at 1216–17. However, as Judge
Rogers pointed out in his dissent, considering the graphic images alongside the textual
elements, something the majority did not do even though the TCA obviously
contemplated that graphics and text would appear together, would lead to a contrary
conclusion about whether the graphic elements presented accurate information. Id. at
1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
443
Id. at 1217 (majority opinion).
444
See id.
440

402

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:331

concerned about the dissenting judge’s criticism that the court was ignoring the government’s other underlying interest, the court added a further
bit of contrived reasoning. The majority stated that more effectively communicating health risks information to consumers was only a means of
serving the solitary interest in reducing smoking rates, and thus could not
serve as a government interest in support of the statute.445
So, with reduction of smoking rates being the only underlying government interest it would acknowledge, the R.J. Reynolds court could then
apply the direct-advancement element of the Central Hudson very strictly
against the government and hold that the government failed it by not proving that the FDA’s graphic images would actually produce lower smoking
rates.446 The court’s approach would seem to pose an unreasonably high
obstacle for the government to clear, in that doing so would likely require
very long-term, elaborately-designed, and expensive studies of numerous
possible graphic images in tightly controlled settings. In the meantime, the
government would be spinning its protection-of-public-health wheels while
a statutory command set forth in the TCA would go unfulfilled.
Conveniently for the court, refusing to recognize improved communication of health risks information as an underlying government interest would
keep the court from having to assert that the FDA’s judgment on what
would likely be effective counts for naught despite the agency’s supposed
expertise. Similarly, it would have been more difficult for the court to argue
that other nations’ perceptions of how effectively pictorial images communicate health risks are irrelevant than it was for the court to point out that
smoking rates had not necessarily declined in those countries.
C. What Should Congress and the FDA Be Able to Do?
If the various strains running through the Supreme Court’s previously
discussed First Amendment precedents are properly applied, most of the
tobacco advertising and marketing provisions Congress enacted in the
TCA and its predecessor, the FCLAA, should stand on firm constitutional
ground. The “[i]f the ... precedents are properly applied” qualifier in the
previous sentence will be important, as this section will suggest and the
following section will address more fully.
With the Central Hudson test, as applied with the degree of rigor demonstrated in Discount Tobacco, providing the controlling framework, these
previously discussed TCA restrictions on advertising and promotion,447
445
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below, make the First Amendment grade (as should corresponding FDA
regulations that may be developed):
x
x

x
x
x
x

The product distribution provisions restricting self-service
displays of tobacco products and requiring retail store personnel to assist in purchases.
The modified-risk products provisions, which require premarket approval by the FDA if certain previously identified representations are made by tobacco manufacturers or
other sellers.
The prohibition on tobacco companies’ labeling or advertising uses of such terms as “light” or “mild.”
The ban on tobacco companies’ distribution of free samples
of tobacco products.
The ban on tobacco companies’ placement of tobacco product names, logos, or symbols on non-tobacco merchandise.
The ban on tobacco companies’ use of tobacco brand
names in sponsoring events.

Each of the above restrictions reflects some combination of interests in
protecting minors’ health, more effectively communicating health risks to
minors and other members of the public in order to further better understanding of the full extent and nature of those risks, and reducing smoking
levels among members of the public. Each restriction bears a sufficiently
close relationship to the underlying government interests, without shutting
off unreasonably large amounts of protected speech.
Of the types of restrictions that the government cannot justify under current commercial speech principles, the most significant is the TCA’s general
requirement that most tobacco advertising employ only a black-and-white
format, without color images. The Discount Tobacco court correctly struck
down this restriction,448 which seems to bear only a speculative relationship
to the underlying government interests and severely restricts advertising
content and techniques that the Supreme Court has clearly said advertisers
should be able to employ. The Court made such statements in Zauderer,449
whose treatment of required commercial speech disclosures can work to the
benefit of the government. If the government wishes to receive the benefit
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of the disclosure requirements aspect of Zauderer,450 it does not seem unreasonable to expect the government to be bound by the decision’s language
favoring advertisers even if that language is not to the government’s liking.
Although the TCA called for reissuance of various mid-1990s FDA
regulations that the Supreme Court struck down on lack-of authority
grounds eight years before the enactment of the TCA, Congress did not
direct the FDA to reissue earlier regulations that restricted outdoor advertising of tobacco advertising within 1000 feet of schools, playgrounds, and
other similar locations where minors would likely be present.451 It is just
as well, given that the Supreme Court’s 2001 Lorillard decision struck
down, on First Amendment grounds, very similar regulations imposed by
the state of Massachusetts.452
The TCA did contain a provision authorizing the FDA to consider
whether there might be ways of engaging in similar outdoor advertising
regulation while remaining in compliance with the First Amendment analysis set forth in Lorillard.453 “Good luck” should be the message to the
FDA on this issue. Lorillard appears to leave little or no room for such
regulation, even though the Court arguably was wrong in striking down
what was a location restriction rather than a content restriction. Absent a
very unlikely overruling of Lorillard by the Supreme Court, the FDA
would more profitably apply its regulatory attention elsewhere.
What about a commercial speech restriction that tobacco companies
have never challenged on First Amendment grounds: the more than
four-decades-old statutory ban on television or radio advertisements for
cigarettes?454 Is this ban on solid ground? Perhaps it is, as a constitutional
matter. As a practical matter, it almost certainly is.
As earlier discussion revealed, tobacco companies did not challenge
the electronic media advertising ban when it was enacted, with one of the
possible reasons being the tobacco industry’s conclusion that ban was
not such a bad deal because it also caused many anti-smoking messages
to disappear from the airwaves.455 Now, however, First Amendment
protection for commercial speech appears to be intensifying under the
Supreme Court’s precedents. Therefore, tobacco companies would have
at least a plausible argument that the electronic media advertising ban
sweeps more broadly in restricting speech than would reasonably be
necessary to further the underlying government interests. It is unclear
450
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whether tobacco companies would succeed with that argument. But what
seems clearer is the probability that no such First Amendment challenge
will be brought. The longstanding nature of the TV and radio ban would
not deprive the tobacco companies of their ability to bring a constitutional
challenge, but the ban’s longstanding nature makes it such an institution
that tobacco companies concerned about public relations would seem
unlikely to institute the litigation. Similarly, a court ruling on such a challenge if one were filed might be inclined to find a way to uphold the wellentrenched ban in order to avoid the appearance of being an applecartupsetting tool of the tobacco industry.
The warning requirements called for in the TCA and the FCLAA (the
predecessor statute that the TCA amended) are consistent with the First
Amendment, though for reasons different from those supporting the regulations discussed earlier. Unlike the Central Hudson–covered restrictions
considered above, the warning mandates are of the disclosure requirements
variety. As such, they are governed by the Zauderer test. Properly applied,
Zauderer indicates that the warning requirements comply with the First
Amendment. As the Discount Tobacco court concluded, this is true of the
warnings’ textual components as well as the color graphics components
contemplated by the TCA because each component serves to provide accurate information regarding health risks in order to prevent misimpressions
on the part of consumers.456
Of course, the constitutionality of the TCA’s general requirement that
the health warnings must include a to-be-devised color graphics element
does not automatically mean that any graphic image the FDA adopts will
automatically pass First Amendment muster. To qualify under Zauderer,
graphic images must present accurate information consistent with the
purpose of better educating consumers about health risks and thereby
preventing misconceptions.457 The Discount Tobacco court offered hypothetical examples that would be permissible under the First Amendment:
an image showing the text of the warning in a child’s handwriting; a
456
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picture or drawing a diseased lung alongside a healthy one; a picture of a
physician reviewing an X-ray of a diseased lung, and so forth.458
Although the R.J. Reynolds court struck down all of the graphic images devised by the FDA and the government later decided to develop new
images instead of appealing the decision, some of the images should have
been upheld. Bringing back any of those images in the same form would
cause the FDA to encounter the wrath of the D.C. Circuit and would result
in success for the FDA only if it could convince the Supreme Court that
the D.C. Circuit ruled incorrectly. Rather than pursue that time-consuming
avenue, the FDA may wish to consider modifying certain currently abandoned images listed earlier in the Article:459 the adult holding a small child
with smoke visible in the air; the picture of the man with the tracheotomy;
the picture of the diseased lungs; and the picture of the person with apparently diseased lips and rotted-out teeth. With modifications more clearly
tying the images to the textual warnings to which they correspond, the
images should be upheld. The other now-abandoned graphic images listed
earlier in the Article should remain abandoned. As deficient and artificial
as the R.J. Reynolds court’s reasoning generally was, the court probably
was right to strike down those other images. Also, the “1–800–QUIT–
NOW” mantra cannot qualify under Zauderer for the reasons noted in the
majority and dissenting opinions in R.J. Reynolds,460 and therefore should
not be employed.
Finally, though it is a relatively close call, the TCA’s manner-of-display
requirements for the required warning461 should be considered permissible.
The specifications concerning warning size and location have attributes of
required disclosures because they are meant to make the warning’s communication of health risks more noticeable and therefore more effective. Under
a proper Zauderer analysis, the manner-of-display requirements would be
upheld. But the manner-of-display requirements also operate as advertising
restrictions because they limit the space tobacco manufacturers have to
communicate messages they would prefer to communicate. In that sense, a
Central Hudson analysis could be appropriate. Even if that test were applied, however, the manner-of-display requirements should be acceptable
under the First Amendment, in light of the government interests at stake and
the reality that the less prominently displayed warnings are likely often
ignored and therefore less effective than they might be in communicating
the extent of the relevant health risks.
458
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D. Appropriate and Inappropriate Analyses if the Supreme Court Were
to Rule
If the Supreme Court hears a tobacco advertising and promotion case
raising issues of the sort presented in Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds,
the key lines of cases, of course, will be those in the Central Hudson line
(for commercial speech restrictions) and those in the Zauderer line (for
required commercial speech disclosures). Central Hudson has survived for
more than three decades despite various Justices’ flirtations with scrapping
it.462 However imperfect it may be, it has continued to win out over other
possible frameworks.
As earlier discussion revealed, the Supreme Court’s applications of the
Central Hudson test in recent years have effectively moved the intermediate
level of First Amendment protection it contemplates closer to the full First
Amendment protection extended to noncommercial speech.463 It is probably
too late in the game to reposition the intermediate level at a lower point, but
the Court should be hesitant, particularly in a tobacco advertising case, to
continue making commercial speech analysis ever more closely resemble
noncommercial speech analysis. If the Court continues to do so, it risks
what Justice Breyer has warned about in dissenting opinions: the danger that
many well-established and important regulatory regimes could too readily
be subjected to a First Amendment-based attack if they restrict speech in
some incidental way.464 Tobacco advertising restrictions of the sort discussed in this Article are not incidental restrictions, but they are far from
arbitrary and are part of larger regulatory schemes that are designed to
address public health matters. The Court must be careful not to let expanding protection for commercial speech unduly hamper the government’s
ability to regulate in the interest of the public.
When the Court reaffirmed Zauderer in the 2010 Milavetz decision, the
Court sent an encouraging sign that it was continuing to evaluate certain
commercial speech disclosure requirements differently from, and more
leniently than, commercial speech restrictions.465 The Court should not
retreat if faced with assessing the textual and graphic warnings called for by
the TCA. In applying Zauderer, the Court should recognize that graphic
images can be factual and accurate and thus potentially sustainable under
462
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those decisions’ test, as the Discount Tobacco court recognized but the R.J.
Reynolds court failed to appreciate.466 Particular graphic images should
then be evaluated for whether they communicate accurate information by
viewing them along with the textual messages to which they correspond—
something the R.J. Reynolds court failed to do.467
With regard to the Zauderer test’s element stating that the required disclosures must be for deception-prevention purposes,468 the Court should
apply this element in a substance-over-form manner that allows a purpose
sufficiently similar to deception-prevention to qualify as well. In the tobacco advertising context, the TCA’s objective of effectively communicating
health risks information in order to prevent misconceptions should be seen
as sufficiently close—as the Discount Tobacco court recognized.469
What if required commercial speech disclosures do not qualify for Zauderer treatment? In that event, the Court should hold that the Central Hudson test controls. In so holding, the R.J. Reynolds court displayed a rare bit
of correct decision-making.470 The Court should resist the temptation to
invoke the compelled speech cases when Zauderer does not apply because
the compelled speech decisions arose from noncommercial speech settings
and involve principles of full First Amendment protection.471 Further blurring of the commercial versus noncommercial line should be avoided.
In addition, the Court should avoid the temptation to resort to the socalled compelled subsidy cases if it has occasion to review the requirement
466
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for warnings featuring graphic elements. The compelled subsidy cases
address the question of whether a company in a certain industry can be
required, under a federal regulatory regime that extensively regulates the
industry, to pay monetary assessments to support industry-promoting
advertisements. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,472 a 1997
decision, the Court held that there was no First Amendment violation in
the requirement that fruit growers pay assessments to fund generic advertisements for fruit-growers as part of an extensive federal regulatory regime dealing with such fruit-growers.473 Yet four years later, in United
States v. United Foods, Inc.,474 the Court held that there was a First
Amendment violation when a mushroom grower was compelled to pay
assessments to fund generic advertisements for mushroom growers generally.475 The Court distinguished Wileman Brothers on the ground that the
regulatory regime there was more extensive than in United Foods and on
the further ground that in United Foods, the speech-affecting provision
appeared to be the primary purpose of the regulatory efforts rather than a
more incidental component.476
The warning requirements contemplated by the TCA seem different
from the specific monetary assessments present in the compelled subsidy
cases, though, of course, tobacco companies are expected to cover the costs
of ensuring that their product packages and advertisements comply with the
required warnings. If the Court were to apply the compelled subsidy cases,
however, the highly detailed regulatory regime set forth in the TCA would
be a complicating factor in the decision whether Wileman Bros. or, instead, United Foods would control. The Court probably should steer clear
of the compelled subsidy cases if it is faced with evaluating the required
health warnings for tobacco products because the compelled subsidy decisions are an uncertain mess, and a mess complicated by another decision
invoking the government speech doctrine. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,477 a 2005 decision, the Court held that a monetary assessment
imposed on beef producers in order to fund generic ads of the sort present in
472
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Wileman Brothers and United Foods did not violate the First Amendment
because the ads funded by the assessment constituted government speech.478
Although the specific contours of the government speech doctrine remain less than clearly defined, active government control of the message
to be communicated appears to be a necessary prerequisite for application
of the doctrine.479 If the Court were deciding a case dealing with the required health warnings for tobacco products, an opening of the door to
consideration of the compelled subsidy cases would likely cause the Court
to have to consider whether the government speech doctrine would apply.
After all, the content of the mandatory warning is scripted by the government. The Court may very well want to stay out of the compelled subsidygovernment speech thicket.
Previous discussion focused on the 2011 Sorrell decision, in which the
Court floated a trial balloon regarding supposed “heightened scrutiny” for
certain commercial speech decisions but ultimately came back to the Central
Hudson case for the actually controlling principles.480 If deciding a tobacco
advertising case or, for that matter, any commercial speech case, the Court
should not attempt to extend the heightened scrutiny approach to any situations other than the one present in Sorrell (a government restriction on marketing-related disclosures or uses of certain information where that very
same information can be widely disclosed and used for other purposes).481
Extending Sorrell any further would needlessly muddy the commercial
speech waters and would, as Justice Breyer stressed in his Sorrell dissent,
open up too many regulatory programs to First Amendment-based attacks.482
Finally, some members of the Court have at times stated or hinted
that commercial speech should not be treated differently from noncommercial speech for First Amendment purposes.483 Yet the distinction in
levels of protection still exists, as it should. Abolishing the distinction
and extending full protection to commercial speech would too drastically
impair governmental ability to regulate on matters of public health, safety, and welfare. Moreover, using a tobacco advertising case as a vehicle
for abolishing the distinction would seem especially inappropriate, given
tobacco use’s regrettable status as “perhaps the single most significant
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threat to public health in the United States.”484 One doubts whether even
those Justices who favor treating commercial speech and noncommercial
speech alike would want to risk being perceived as residing in the pockets
of the tobacco industry.
CONCLUSION
With the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2009 (TCA), the federal government launched a major effort
to regulate the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. It was by no
means the government’s first effort in that regard, because federally required health warnings have appeared on tobacco product packages and in
advertisements for such products for more than four decades and televised
advertisements for cigarettes have been banned for roughly the same
length of time. But the TCA marked a significant expansion and rampingup of the government’s regulatory regime. Through a combination of TCA
measures directly regulating tobacco product promotion and directions to
the FDA to develop appropriate rules, Congress sought more effective
ways to communicate the health risks of tobacco use to the public—
especially to minors. Congress also sought in the TCA to lessen the influence of tobacco companies’ promotional activities on minors and to lower
smoking rates among minors as well as the public generally.
The new regulatory regime set up by the TCA restricted tobacco advertising and promotion in various ways. It also significantly modified the longrequired health warnings that must appear on tobacco product packages and
in advertisements by requiring the inclusion of color graphics along with the
text of the warnings and by specifying that the text-and-graphics warning be
very prominently displayed on packages and in advertisements. In addition,
the TCA directed the FDA to develop particular graphic images that the
tobacco industry would be required to use in their display of the federally
mandated warnings. Tobacco companies have brought First Amendmentbased challenges to the TCA’s various advertising and promotion provisions
and to the FDA’s later-promulgated regulation setting forth particular graphic images for required use by the tobacco industry. One federal circuit upheld
most, but not all, of the TCA’s advertising and promotion provisions. Another circuit invalidated the graphic images devised by the FDA and sent the
agency back to the drawing board.
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Proper resolution of the First Amendment issues associated with the
TCA and related FDA regulations depends upon appropriate navigation of
different free speech streams set forth in Supreme Court precedents. This
Article’s exploration of those streams and its analysis of the two key federal circuit decisions lead to the conclusion that if properly applied, relevant First Amendment principles should provide the government a fairly
long but not limitless leash when it regulates tobacco advertising and promotion. The Article also furnishes guidance to courts and regulators on
particular measures Congress and the FDA should and should not be able
to employ in light of the First Amendment. The Article’s cautionary remarks about First Amendment thickets to avoid should also be useful if
the Supreme Court opts to decide a tobacco advertising case and seeks to
rule in a way that does not inject further confusion into an already toodisjointed area of the law.

